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Abstract 
While many countries are facing difficulties in implementing transitional justice 
mechanisms, designed mainly to include different stakeholders in the process, in very few 
contexts have perpetrators been perceived as active participants who represent a potential 
resource to the process. This study examines and compares two contexts in which this has 
been so. Its central objective is to understand to what extent the practice of plea 
bargaining with perpetrators of war crimes at the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) contributed to the process of establishing the truth about past abuses 
and to compare this with probably the most controversial aspect of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (TRC) - granting of amnesty to the 
responsible for the atrocities during apartheid. Drawing on both contexts, this study 
argues that that acknowledgment given by perpetrators potentially constitutes a legitimate 
and in some contexts crucial transitional justice mechanism. The study has not examined 
all the issues relating to these processes, recognizing their complexity in both the 
historical development of the field of transitional justice and the specific features of the 
process in each context. The study was developed at two levels, firstly through a 
normative analysis of the aims and objectives of the plea bargaining process at the ICTY 
and amnesty process at the TRC and secondly, through historical and factual 
investigation of the processes and outcomes in relation to the criteria set out for processes 
ICTY and TRC adopted. The main aim was to analyze what were the outcomes of these 
two processes in terms of contributing to the process of establishment of truth.  
Recognizing that these processes were inherently different from each other – one being 
implemented in criminal trials, and other in truth commission, it is important to note that 
these have been the only two examples to date to include a form of compromise with 
perpetrators as one of their main strategies for the process of establishing truth. While 
recognizing that serious criticism have been made against both institutions for this 
compromises, this study concludes that any truth process, if trying to be comprehensive, 
will have to include perpetrators, because only they can provide the most important 
element in dealing with the human rights violations and the one most difficult to be 
obtained - acknowledgment by those who actually committed the crime.      
2 
 
Abstract................................................................................................................................1 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1. The objective of truth processes in post-conflict societies...........................................3 
1.2. General problem: Acknowledgment of past abuses.....................................................9 
       1.2.1. Models of transitional justice and acknowledgment.........................................11 
       1.2.2. Thesis statement................................................................................................15 
       1.2.3. Problem statement and research questions: perpetrators’ acknowledgment...16  
 
Chapter 2 – Background accounts of the ICTY and SATRC 
2.1. The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia......................................20 
       2.1.1. The establishment of the Tribunal ...................................................................20 
       2.1.2. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal .......................................................................20 
       2.1.3. Achievements of the Tribunal ..........................................................................22 
2.2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa..............................................24 
 
Chapter 3 – Background to plea bargaining and conditional amnesty  
3.1. Background to plea bargaining...................................................................................29 
       3.1.1. History of plea bargaining................................................................................29 
       3.1.2 Values and problems of plea bargaining ..........................................................33  
3.2. From blanket amnesty to conditional amnesty...........................................................35 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Chapter 4 - Plea bargaining practice at the ICTY 
4.1. Causes of introducing plea bargaining at the ICTY....................................................41 
4.2. Plea bargaining process at the ICTY – Procedure......................................................45  
 
Chapter 5 – Conditional amnesty at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa 
5.1. The Amnesty process at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa – 
Procedure...........................................................................................................................50 
5.2. Amnesty process at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa – 
Criteria...............................................................................................................................53 
 
Chapter 6 - Transitional justice and truth-telling in post-conflict societies  
 
6.1. Conditional amnesty and truth-telling at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa.......................................................................................................................59  
6.2. Plea bargaining process and establishment of truth at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.........................................................................................72  
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion......................................................................................................82 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………87 
 
 
3 
 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1. The objective of truth processes in post-conflict societies 
 
The objective of this thesis is to understand to what extent the practice of plea bargaining 
and acceptance of guilty pleas as developed by the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia [ICTY] actually contributed to the process of establishing the truth about past 
abuses by comparing this practice with the full disclosure condition for the granting of 
amnesty at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa [SATRC]. In order 
to understand this, it is first necessary to understand what the process of establishment of 
truth in a post-conflict society actually represents and what the normative framework of 
the process is.  
 
After a period of oppression characterized by massive and systematic human rights 
violations, or after a violent conflict, as a consequence of developments of human rights 
movement, the need to deal with the legacy of the past crimes and abuses became one of 
the first requests and challenges put before new democratic governments by their own 
citizens, mainly those that survived suffering during human rights violations. Among 
other mechanisms transitional societies implemented, such as prosecuting responsible, 
reforming abusive institutions and repairing damages done to victims, establishment of 
truth have emerged as a process which is not only needed, but necessary if a society 
decides to face the legacy of crimes from the past. Establishing truth about past atrocities 
in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian society is important not only because of truth 
itself, but as a precondition for other mechanisms of transitional justice. In order to 
punish those responsible for atrocities, we need to know what crimes to punish and 
establish facts about crimes in order to establish accountability of the person indicted 
before the court of law. If measures for reparations are to be instigated, it has to come 
after some form of truth-finding process which is necessary to determine who should 
benefit from the reparative measures and what was the nature of the damage inflicted 
upon them – truth processes determine who the victims are and what kind of reparations 
4 
 
are necessary. Establishing truth about crimes is also a precondition for reforms of 
institutions – in order to establish which institutions and their members took an active 
role in atrocities so as to be able to remove them from these institutions. Establishing 
truth in a post-conflict setting is of crucial importance for preventing denial as well as lies 
about crimes that former regime or conflicting sides can spread or nurture – if truth about 
crimes is ignored, as Zalaquett argued, ‘inevitably the void would be filled with lies or 
with conflicting, confusing versions of the past’.1 Finally, establishing truth can provide a 
form of social catharsis necessary for the acceptance of victims’ suffering and 
condemnation of abuses by the majority within a society, therefore having a significant 
role in preventing the crimes from happening again.2  
 
Establishing truth through different bodies has long been accepted as a practice needed 
after a violent conflict or massive human rights violations. Additional to that, the process 
of establishment of truth has become an integral part of international legal standards, and 
fulfilling the right to truth has been defined as a state obligation by international courts 
and different UN bodies. The first legal document, that clearly defined that states have ‘a 
duty to investigate facts’ about crimes of enforced disappearances was the judgment of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez case.3 In the 
report “The administration of justice and the human rights detainees - Question of the 
impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political) prepared for the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
Commission for Human Rights of the UN, Louis Joinet, one of the most prominent 
experts in international law, defined legal rights that belong to victims of human rights 
abuses. According to Joinet, these are the right to know, the right to justice and the right 
to reparations.4  
 
                                                 
1 Jose Zalaquett, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations,” Hastings Law Journal, (1992): pp. 1433.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Case of  Velasquez-Rodriguez v.Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 
(1988).  
4 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Question of the impunity of 
perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political), (26 June 1997), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20.. 
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These rights do not belong exclusively to victims – Joinet argued that the whole society 
has a right to know what happened in the past:  
 
“This is not simply the right of any individual victim or his nearest and dearest to 
know what happened, a right to the truth. The right to know is also a collective 
right, drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in the future. Its 
corollary is a “duty to remember” on the part of the State: to be forearmed against 
the perversions of history that go under the names of revisionism or negationism 
(…) These, then, are the main objectives of the right to know as a collective 
right.”5   
 
In 2005, Diane Orentlicher, an independent expert on the question of impunity appointed 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights, reviewed international law and practices that 
state employ in order to combat impunity in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian setting. 
Orentlicher defined the principle of the right to know, stating that “[every] people has the 
inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of 
heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or 
systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes.  Full and effective exercise of 
the right to the truth provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.”6 
More importantly, Orentlicher stressed the victims’ right to know: “victims and their 
families have the imprescriptible right to know the truth about the circumstances in which 
violations took place and, in the event of death or disappearance, the victims’ fate.”7   
 
Orentlicher also listed measures states must introduce in order to fulfill the right to know, 
including ‘measures necessary to ensure the independent and effective operation of the 
judiciary, to give effect to the right to know’, including truth commissions or 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert to update the Set of principles to combat 
impunity, (February 8, 2005), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 
7 Ibid, Principle 4.  
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commissions of inquiry ‘to establish the facts surrounding those violations so that the 
truth may be ascertained and to prevent the disappearance of evidence’.8 
 
Hence, fulfillment of the right to truth has slowly developed from being a choice that is 
implemented by governments that are willing enough, into being understood as the 
obligation of states emerging from conflict or massive human rights violations periods. 
The United Nations continued to develop this understanding of a right to truth and truth 
processes. In 2006 the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights concluded that ‘the right to the truth about gross human rights violations and 
serious violations of human rights law is an inalienable and autonomous right, linked to 
the duty and obligation of the State to protect and guarantee human rights, to conduct 
effective investigations and to guarantee effective remedy and reparations’.9 
Additionally, it was re-affirmed that the right to truth has its roots in international 
humanitarian law, primarily with regards to families of victims of enforced 
disappearances,10 but also with regards to other serious human rights violations, such as 
extrajudicial executions and torture.11 This has been upheld by many relevant instances – 
from the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, UN Secretary General, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, etc.12 The 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights study report of 2006 stated that 
the right to truth is deeply rooted in international law and it is “recognized in several 
international treaties and instruments as well as by national, regional and international 
jurisprudence and numerous resolutions of intergovernmental bodies at the universal and 
regional levels”.13 
                                                 
8 Ibid, Principle 5. 
9 ECS, Commission on Human Rights, Study on the right to the truth, Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, (8 February 2006) E/CN.4/2006/91.   
10 “The principle of the right to the truth for relatives of missing persons, including the victims of forced 
disappearance, is explicitly codified in international humanitarian law in article 32 of the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, of 12 August 1949.” Ibid, par.6. 
11 Ibid, par.8. 
12 Ibid, par.12-32. 
13Ibid, par.55.   
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The report closely connects the right to the truth with other rights that belong to victims 
of human rights violations, such as the right to an effective remedy, the right to legal and 
judicial protection, the right to an effective investigation, the right to a hearing by a 
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, the right to obtain reparation, the right to 
seek and impart information, etc.14 However, the right itself does not belong to victims 
exclusively – it also belongs to society which ‘has the right to know the truth about past 
events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes, as well as the circumstances and 
the reasons for which aberrant crimes came to be committed, so that such events do not 
reoccur in the future’.15 
 
Finally, the report defined what the right to truth encompasses – it represents ‘knowing 
the full and complete truth as to the events that transpired, their specific circumstances, 
and who participated in them, including knowing the circumstances in which the 
violations took place, as well as the reasons for them. In cases of enforced disappearance, 
missing persons, children abducted or during the captivity of a mother subjected to 
enforced disappearance, secret executions and secret burial place, the right to the truth 
also has a special dimension:  to know the fate and whereabouts of the victim’.16 
 
Mechanisms for fulfillment of the right to truth are not only truth-seeking bodies, such as 
truth commissions, or commissions of inquiry, but also international criminal tribunals, 
national criminal tribunals, national human rights institutions and other administrative 
bodies and proceedings.17 As suggested by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights: “Judicial criminal proceedings, with a broad legal standing in the judicial 
process for any wronged party and to any person or non-governmental organization 
having a legitimate interest therein, are essential to ensuring the right to the truth.”18 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid, par.42. 
15 Ibid, par.58. 
16 Ibid, par.59. 
17 Ibid, par.61. 
18 Ibid. 
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Most importantly for our purposes, the issue of making compromises with perpetrators in 
different forms, and their relation with the fulfillment of the right to truth for victims was 
also analyzed. The UN Report concluded that ‘amnesties or similar measures and 
restrictions to the right to seek information must never be used to limit, deny or impair 
the right to the truth’.19   
 
Before discussing whether making compromises with perpetrators could actually 
contribute to the process of establishing truth, the basic question is what the process of 
establishing truth represents in a broader societal context. Truth processes are instigated 
in post-conflict society in order to establish an accurate record of abuses and 
wrongdoings of the past – to discover and clarify what happened in the past and formally 
acknowledge crimes that were committed in the past.20 In the majority of these 
experiments, truth processes in the form of truth and reconciliation commissions or other 
types of investigative commissions and bodies, criminal prosecutions of responsible, 
reparations’ programmes and vetting procedures, include establishing facts about crimes 
from the past, revealing information that were either silenced or denied about abuses that 
victims survived. In order to unearth these hidden stories about crimes from the past, 
truth processes typically relye on victims’ testimonies, i.e. the stories of those who 
suffered the most, establishing overall patterns of violence and giving voice to those who 
were silenced during abuses.21  
 
However, when most facts about crimes are uncovered and represented in public, it is 
vital for the society that these facts are also acknowledged.22 As Priscilla Hayner 
recorded, there is a strong argument that truth processes do not so much find new truths, 
or uncover something completely unknown, as much as breaking the silence about 
‘widely known but unspoken truth’: “The official and public recognition of past abuses 
serves to effectively unsilence a topic that might otherwise be spoken of only in hushed 
                                                 
19 Ibid, par.60. 
20 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable truths: transitional justice and the challenge of truth commissions, 2nd ed, 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 20. 
21 Ibid,  20. 
22 Elizabeth Kiss, “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative 
Justice” in Truth v.Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, eds.Robert I.Rotberg and 
DennisThompson, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 71.   
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tones, long considered too dangerous for general conversation, rarely reported honestly in 
the press, and certainly out of bounds for the official history taught in schools.”23  
 
Acknowledgment of truth about crimes is crucial mainly for victims that suffered – while 
they know what happened, and many facts established by commissions or courts of law, 
vetting programmes or reparation measures are not unknown to them, the confirmation of 
their claims is what represents the most important value of such a truth process. In this 
way, knowledge is officially sanctioned, it becomes part of the ‘public cognitive scene’, 
and what used to be denied now becomes truth.24 
 
The main question that this thesis wants to understand is what the contribution of plea 
bargaining process as a form of compromise with perpetrators, through their 
acknowledgment, as designed by the ICTY might be to the process of establishing the 
truth. For that purpose, it has to be examined with the help of only one similar process of 
compromises with perpetrators until now, the amnesty process at the SATRC. It is 
important to ask to what extent the contribution of granting conditional amnesty by the 
SATRC was understood as part of a process of establishing of truth, and what that 
contribution was. It will be examined through looking at the goals and objectives of the 
SATRC, as defined by its founding act, the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act [PNUR]. In order to understand the contribution of granting amnesty 
to the establishment of truth process, the purpose and the procedure as defined by the Act 
shall be analyzed.     
 
1.2. General problem: Acknowledgment of past abuses 
 
One of the most common problems that societies in transition from an authoritarian 
regime to democracy or from conflict to peace face is the problem of how to secure an 
acknowledgment of massive human rights violations and crimes that were committed 
during the previous regime or conflict. In many such cases, abuses were massive and 
                                                 
23 Hayner, 20. 
24 Hayner, 21. 
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systematic, victims have been denied truth about the facts about crimes and/or access to 
justice, while perpetrators who committed atrocities continue to enjoy impunity while 
denying the truth about their part in such atrocities and continuing to contest claims about 
their accountability. Therefore, attempts to achieve acknowledgment of past crimes have 
been seen as necessary not only to create an accurate historical record, but also to 
challenge claims that these crimes never happened, to ensure that victims receive some 
satisfaction for the suffering they had endured and that perpetrators face accountability 
for the abuses that were committed. When these attempts are official, they receive 
enormous public attention enabling the abuses to become publicly known and officially 
acknowledged. Society as a whole and victims particularly need public acknowledgment 
of past state crimes.25  
The importance of an official acknowledgment of abuses in a post-conflict society or a 
society that experienced massive human rights violations in the past has been emphasized 
by the philosopher Thomas Nagel who made a distinction between knowledge about and 
acknowledgment of the past. “[Acknowledgment is] what happens and can only happen 
to knowledge when it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public 
cognitive scene”.26 While knowledge of past crimes exists in some way in a post-conflict 
society, mainly among perpetrators and victims themselves, and to some extent among 
the wider community, on the official level there is often a lack of will to acknowledge 
and official denialism continues. The refusal to acknowledge state crimes is a political 
issue. Firstly, this is because the refusal to acknowledge victims’ suffering in public is a 
demonstration or a result of the political power that perpetrators may still hold or enjoy 
some form of protection within the new government. Such denial represents a double 
violation for victims, political and legal. Victims re-suffer the pain inflicted on them 
while their human and civic dignity is repeatedly denied since that pain is not 
acknowledged as legitimate. Secondly, the refusal to acknowledge past abuses represents 
not only an assertion of power by the perpetrators but also the incapability of the state to 
                                                 
25 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial – Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2001), 225.  
26 Quoted in Lawrence Weschler, “A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers”, in 
Transitional Justice: How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, Vol.1, ed.Neil Kritz, 
(Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1995), 492.  
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deal with past state crimes. Thirdly, without official acknowledgment of past abuses, 
transitional states show a lack of commitment to the establishment of truth, ensuring 
accountability and finally to moving the society into the process of reconciliation, thus 
opening a space for such crimes to reoccur.  
1.2.1. Models of transitional justice and acknowledgment 
After a period of oppression or violent conflict, a growing number of countries and 
societies have been choosing to deal with past atrocities and their impact on present 
efforts to move forward. Dealing with the past thus is, in general, especially significant 
for victims of past crimes and their families, who often express their need to know what 
happened to their loved ones, to know who made them suffer and to have someone admit 
responsibility for what happened. Victims, but also society in general request some form 
of official acknowledgment of the facts about these crimes and accountability for crimes 
committed. The acknowledgment of crimes also constitutes an acknowledgment of 
victims as such – not to deny their stories and question their claims on suffering they 
have experienced.  
Acknowledgment presents one of the most important issues of transitional justice.27 It 
represents one of the common goals of all the measures that societies faced with the 
legacies of past atrocities and state crimes instigate, i.e. the various processes of dealing 
with the past in order to know what happened and to admit what happened. There are 
different models of “dealing with the past” developed by transitional societies over recent 
decades, involving different configurations of truth processes and forms of 
acknowledging accountability: trials, truth commissions, mass disqualifications and 
reform of institutions, reparations, memorializations, apologies, reconciliation, etc.28 In 
recent years, the term ‘transitional justice’ has come into use to fully describe all these 
                                                 
27 André du Toit, “The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC – Truth as Acknowledgment and 
Justice as Recognition”, in Truth v.Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, eds.Robert I.Rotberg and 
DennisThompson, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 132.   
28 Luc Huyse, “Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past”, 
in Transitional Justice: How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, Vol.1, ed.Neil Kritz, 
(Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1995), 104-114; Hayner, 7-10. 
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different activities.29  Some introduction to these different models is needed in order to 
see how they contribute to acknowledgement, as groundwork for the larger goals of this 
thesis.  
Truth commissions are state-established institutions focused either solely or at least 
chiefly on discovering the facts about past political offences and recovering the truth 
about state crimes denied during the conflict or period of oppression. They are victim-
centered bodies, basing their reports’ findings primarily on victims’ accounts, thus 
acknowledging the truth based on accounts of those whose truth was denied.30 Truth 
commissions provide victims a stage to tell their mostly untold stories of suffering and 
human rights violations they endured, and by doing that, they present one of the most 
effective models in obtaining public acknowledgment since victims are given an official 
recognition of their account of the violations they suffered. Truth commissions also 
typically have power to propose other measures to obtain acknowledgment, by 
recommending prosecutions of responsible individuals, reparations for victims and other 
policies of institutional reform to governments. This can help to repair damage inflicted 
on victims as well as strengthen the rule of law by leading to the reform of abusive 
institutions and the adoption of new laws in accordance with respect for human rights, 
etc. They also contribute to establish accountability – truth commissions, especially 
following the model of the SATRC, had significant powers to identify perpetrators, 
‘name and shame’ them publicly, and eventually recommend them to judicial authorities 
for prosecutions.31  
The criminal prosecution of responsible individuals and trials is the traditional way of 
establishing the accountability of the perpetrators of political atrocities and state crimes, 
especially through trials of state agents by national courts but, if states are unwilling or 
the conflict is still on-going, also through international courts.32 Criminal prosecutions 
                                                 
29 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 4.  
30 Freeman, 16. 
31 Hayner, 93-94.  
32 The second model was instigated in the case of former Yugoslavia in which the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was established in 1993 by the Security Council of the United Nations. 
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also function as forensic truth processes with regard to establishing the detailed facts 
about crimes after a strict process of examining the evidence of the guilt or innocence of 
the accused perpetrators. They may also contribute to acknowledgment, since prosecuting 
those responsible implies that a state does acknowledge that the crimes occurred, and 
acknowledge that the practice of the past regimes or during a violent conflict were wrong 
and unlawful. However, they do not accomplish much by way of acknowledgement of 
the context that led to the crime occurring or acknowledging, in any complete way, the 
truths felt to be important by victims about past political crimes – victims are typically 
treated as ordinary witnesses at these trials. The focus of criminal justice trials rests 
almost solely on perpetrators.  
Mass disqualifications, such as the lustration models employed in post-communist 
Eastern European countries, do not significantly contribute to acknowledgment. Blanket 
disqualification of persons connected to an organization or engaged in activities of 
denunciation to police,33 mainly conducted by ministries of interior affairs, or 
commissions for lustration does not achieve acknowledgment of accountability or truth 
about past crimes since they are usually conducted without full transparency and 
sometimes based on questionable sources.34 However, new models of institutional 
reforms such as vetting processes, which emerged recently in different transitional 
societies, are usually “aimed at screening public employees or candidates for public 
employment to determine if their prior conduct (including, most importantly from a 
transitional justice perspective, their respect for human rights standards) warrants their 
exclusion from public institutions”35. According to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations “vetting usually entails a formal process for the identification and removal of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes against Humanity: Struggle for Global Justice (London: Penguin Group, 
2006), 378. 
33 Herman Schwartz, “Lustration in Eastern Europe”, in Transitional Justice: How emerging democracies 
reckon with former regimes, Vol.1, ed. Neil Kritz, , (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 
1995), 467.  
34 Schwartz uses the examples of Poland 1992 where new government attempted to discredit its political 
opponents through publishing a list of alleged collaborators using unreliable sources and unqualified staff. 
Ibid, 464-465.  
35 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in 
Transitional Societies, (New York: Social science research council, 2007), accessed February 28, 2012, 
http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7B57efec93-284a-de11-afac-
001cc477ec70%7D.pdf, 17. 
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individuals responsible for abuses, especially from police, prison services, the army and 
the judiciary”36.Comparatively, this formal process is usually public and transparent, and 
include participation of different groups in society.37 While purges did not contribute 
significantly to acknowledgment, it can be argued that vetting procedures, with their 
public and transparent procedure, conducted with respect to human rights standards, and 
with the purpose to establish who should be removed from institutions for human rights 
violations in the past, do contribute to the official acknowledgment that certain 
individuals representing institutions were involved in human rights violations.  
Contribution to acknowledgment present one of the most important goals of reparations 
programmes, material or symbolic, individual or collective, court or administrative, not 
only as the form of satisfaction, but also as part of the process of “verification of the facts 
and full and public disclosure of the truth” as defined by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 60/147’s Principle 22.38 The processes of commemoration and 
memorialization, as well as formal and official apologies have received serious attention 
and became increasingly popular in post-conflict societies, and not only in these – 
developed societies often use these forms, especially apologies, in order to correct certain 
historical injustices that happened long before.39 Commemorating the victims of past 
crimes through building memorials, naming streets and declaring days of remembrance 
are more readily achieved in a post-conflict society destroyed by wars than by financial 
compensation, and represent a significant means to acknowledge and empower 
marginalized communities, as in South Africa.  
                                                 
36 UNSG, The rule of law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, (23.August 
2004), S/2004/616.  
37 Ibid. 
38 UNGA, Forms of reparations are: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition, as defined by the UN General Assembly in 2005. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, (16 December 2005) A/RES/60/147.    
39 Elazar Barkan calls this phenomenon a “victims culture”. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: restitution 
and negotiating historical injusticxes, (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 2000), 7. Some of examples 
are apologies that were offered by the USA government for the eradication of Native Americans, slavery, 
drug experiments on black prisoners, etc. Stanley Cohen, States of Denial – Knowing about Atrocities and 
Suffering, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 247.  
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It may thus be concluded from the previous analysis that all models of transitional justice 
may in different ways contribute to the acknowledgment of past abuses.  
1.2.2. Thesis statement 
The complex interaction between these different elements / mechanisms of transitional 
justice and acknowledgment indicate the need for a more rigorous analysis of different 
models of transitional justice employed to contribute to or achieve acknowledgment. A 
systematic comparative analysis is beyond the limitations of this thesis – and hopefully 
will be a project for the future. For now, let it be sufficient to focus primarily on one such 
mechanism, used in response to violations perpetrated during the conflicts in the 1990s in 
the Balkans, introduced especially to establish facts and obtain acknowledgment in their 
respective cases, i.e. that of plea-bargaining agreements.  
The contention of this thesis is that acknowledgment of past abuses by perpetrators 
potentially constitutes a legitimate and in some contexts crucial transitional justice 
mechanism. In practice, the acknowledgment by a perpetrator of committed abuses can 
most successfully be obtained through some form of plea-bargaining involving 
acknowledging the truth about past abuses in exchange for avoiding prosecution for 
human rights violations. This assumes that perpetrators’ acknowledgments of past abuses 
contribute to the process of establishment of truth, and thus serve as a precondition for a 
process of reconciliation fostering peace and stability in a society otherwise burdened 
with ongoing contestations about the truth of past abuses.40  
It can be argued that the acknowledgement of truth about and responsibility for abuses, 
specifically coming from those who instigated, ordered and committed them presents the 
clearest break from the criminal practices of the past and can contribute to reconciliation. 
As Alex Boraine stated in 2002 in his testimony atICTY’s hearing when former Bosnian 
Serbs leader, Biljana Plavšić, pleaded guilty for crimes committed during Bosnian 
conflict:  
                                                 
40 Prosecutor v.Biljana PlavšićPlavšić, pg.600 of English provisional transcript, 17 December 2002. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe3940/021217IT.htm. Accessed on: 10 February 2008. 
16 
 
“I have no doubt that admissions of responsibility, particularly from civilian and 
military leaders, I think that's key, can help prevent basic points of fact from 
continuing to be a source of conflict or bitterness. And this, of course, in turn, can 
help to reduce tensions in society and thereby facilitate peaceful coexistence or 
reconciliation, so there is a potential to break the cycle of violence and create a more 
sustainable peace as a result.”41 
Therefore, some form of compromise with perpetrators that will provide truth may be 
necessary to secure the acknowledgment of those that committed the most heinous 
abuses, and to prevent that many facts about crimes may remain covered while those co-
responsible go unpunished. It is the contention of this thesis that by securing 
acknowledgement of truths from those who committed crimes or participated in them by 
plea-bargaining agreements, we can significantly and effectively contribute to an official 
acknowledgment of past atrocities. 
1.2.3. Problem statement and research questions: perpetrators’ acknowledgment 
The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 
1993 for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.42 
Although established as a criminal court with the clear purpose to prosecute perpetrators, 
the founders of the Tribunal understood its potential as a mechanism for process of 
reconciliation in the Balkans contributing to ‘restoring and maintaining peace’:  
 
“Its mission is to promote reconciliation through the prosecution, trial and 
punishment of those who perpetrated war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. By ensuring that people are held individually responsible for the crimes 
they committed, the International Tribunal must prevent entire groups – be they 
national, ethnic or religious – from being stigmatised and must ensure that others 
                                                 
41 Testimony of Alexander Boraine, Prosecutor v.Biljana Plavšić, pg.600 of English provisional transcript, 
17 December 2002. Available at: http://www.un.org/icty/transe3940/021217IT.htm. Accessed on: 10 
February 2008. 
42 Security Council Resolution 827, (25 May1993), S/RES/827.  
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do not resort to acts of revenge in their search for justice. (…) Finally, by 
establishing the legal truth on whose basis society can take shape, the 
International Tribunal must prevent all historical revisionism.”43 
Significantly, the practice of compromises with perpetrators through plea bargaining was 
at the beginning rejected by the ICTY, and was considered incompatible with the goals of 
the Tribunal – goals that differ significantly from the typical objectives of criminal 
proceedings – namely, to restore the peace and maintenance of peace and stability and 
restoration of the rule of law in former Yugoslavia. Additionally, the goal of prosecuting 
those held to be most responsible was supposed to break the cycle of violence in the 
region, enhance reconciliation and establish a historical record that would prevent the 
denial of crimes that were committed, thus taking the form of a truth process.44 However, 
after its case-load increased significantly, the ICTY began implementing a plea 
bargaining practice firstly in order to resolve cases more efficiently, but also to shed more 
light on complex cases and to create a more comprehensive historical record.45 It can be 
argued that the main reason that stood behind the decision to introduce a plea bargaining 
practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was in accordance 
with the goals of the ICTY: the effort to achieve acknowledgment of perpetrators, thus 
fostering reconciliation.  
Alex Boraine, during a sentence hearing in the case of Plavšić, who pleaded guilty at the 
ICTY, “when someone who is in a significant leadership position actually makes the 
break, as has been done in this case, and can prompt - and who knows whether this will 
help or not - but there is a potential, at least, of prompting other leaders to come forward. 
                                                 
43Claude Jorda, “The ICTY and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
speech made on 12 May 2001 in Sarajevo; ICTY Press Release The Hague, 17 May 2001. Available at:  
http://www.icty.org/sid/7985. Accessed on: 22.12 2012. 
44 Michael Scharf, “Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea Bargainig and International Tribunals”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 1072-1073.  
45 Alan Tieger and Milbert Shin, “Plea Agreements in the ICTY”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 
3, (2005): 671.  
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[It's] also true that her statements could (…) help catalyze or initiate a process of honest 
truth-telling and acknowledgement throughout former Yugoslavia.”46 
The only similar transitional justice initiative that included some form of compromises 
with perpetrators was the SATRC. This commission was established for similar reasons – 
one of them being to create an accurate record of what happened during the apartheid era 
in order to counter distorted and partial history of South Africa.47 This was attempted by 
introducing a rather controversial process of granting amnesty to perpetrators on 
condition of full disclosure which was basically an offer of immunity from criminal 
prosecution to perpetrators in exchange for truth.  
The discussion in this thesis will examine a model that was set up in order to achieve 
acknowledgment and contribute to truth about crimes after a period of violent conflict 
through perpetrators’ admittance responsibility for the crimes they were indicted for - a 
plea bargaining practice at the ICTY. A useful lens for this examination is the only 
similar process used in a post-conflict society, the amnesty process at the SATRC. This 
thesis shall not examine all the issues relating to these processes, recognizing their 
complexity in both the historical development and specific features of the process in each 
case, but will try to focus on a few, selected questions.  
While these two practices were implemented in two different transitional contexts – one 
was introduced in criminal prosecutions at an international tribunal while the other was 
introduced in a truth and reconciliation commission -- the objectives of these two 
practices were, broadly stated, to help establish sufficient truth to work with. The ICTY 
was not exclusively dedicated to justice and the TRC was not only concerned with truth. 
While the ICTY’s mandate was focused on accountability through prosecuting 
individuals for their crimes, the Tribunal also served as a forensic truth process, 
emphasizing its feature of establishing facts. On the other hand, the SATRC was focused 
on truth as acknowledgement, however it also tried to establish a form of accountability 
for those that committed abuses during apartheid era. Looking at the ICTY plea 
                                                 
46 Testimony of Alexander Boraine, 17 December 2002. Available at: 
ttp://www.un.org/icty/transe3940/021217IT.htm. Accessed on: 10 February 2008.  
47 Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked, (Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2000), 287. 
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bargaining process through the lenses of the SATRC can be mutually illuminating for a 
better understanding of both processes, and a comparative analysis can raise important 
questions in relation to both SATRC and the ICTY.   
 
The main object of this thesis is to examine whether a plea bargaining process as created 
by the ICTY, when compared to the conditional amnesty created by the South African 
SATRC, is in theory compatible with the principle of truth in transitional justice: Is 
employing the compromise of truth for justice in this way  in accordance with the broader 
goals of transitional justice in post-conflict societies? More specifically, one of the 
objectives of this thesis will be to understand to what extent a practice of plea bargaining 
and the acceptance of guilty pleas by the ICTY, compared with full disclosure as 
condition for amnesty at the SATRC, actually contributed to the process of establishment 
of truth. The main question remains - do these practices constitute a form of an 
acknowledgment? This shall be answered through looking at the aims, objectives and 
practices that were set out during establishment of these bodies, and analyzing the 
reasons for introducing these practices. Finally, both these practices were introduced as 
necessary in order to create a more accurate historical record, but the question remains 
how the facts about crimes given by perpetrators are supposed to contribute to creation of 
an unbiased historical record. By examining this issue, this thesis shall at the end discuss 
how the exchange for truth relates to the objective of truth as acknowledgment in post 
conflict society.  
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Chapter 2 – Background accounts of the ICTY and SATRC 
 
 
2.1. The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
 
 
2.1.1. The establishment of the Tribunal  
 
In 1993, while the devastating conflict in Bosnia was raging on the UN Security Council, 
in an attempt to stop inter-ethnic atrocities and re-establish peace in the former 
Yugoslavia, adopted the UN SC resolutions 808 and 827 and thus established the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague for the prosecution of persons responsible 
for the serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991.48 
 
2.1.2. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal  
 
According to its Statute, the ICTY has a mandate to prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991. The Tribunal is prosecuting those responsible for grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.49 The Tribunal also has the power to 
prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war.50 Article 4 of the Statute provides 
                                                 
48 Security Council Resolution 827, (25 May1993), S/RES/827.  
49 As defined by the Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTY there are: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly, compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power, wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian, taking civilians as hostages.” International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (September 2009),   
50 These include, but are not limited to “the employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated 
to cause unnecessary suffering, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified 
by military necessity, attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings, seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, 
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science, plunder of 
public or private property. Ibid., Article 3.  
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the Tribunal with the power to punish genocide.51 Genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide 
and complicity in genocide are all acts that are punishable at the ICTY.52 The Tribunal 
also has the power to punish crimes against humanity.53 All of these crimes have long 
been established in international law but the ICTY brought certain innovative 
components.54   
 
The Tribunal has the power to prosecute persons based only on individual responsibility, 
unlike its predecessor Nuremberg, whose mandate included offences by organizations 
and associations.55 The Article 7 of the Statute defines individual criminal responsibility, 
thus continuing some of the important features of Nuremberg, such as the non-existence 
of sovereign immunity and the existence of command responsibility. According to the 
Article 7, para.2 “the official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment”.56 The crimes of subordinates remains a 
responsibility of their superior commander, “if he knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
                                                 
51 According to the ICTY Statute, genocide are all these acts: “the killings of  members of the group, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,  deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
– if all these acts were committed with “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group”. Ibid., Article 4 (2).  
52 Ibid., Article 4 (3). 
53 Which include “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds and other inhumane acts directed against any civilian 
population”. Ibid., Article 5.  
54 Genocide was defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide in 1948, Geneva 
Conventions I-IV and Additional Protocols I-II are part of the international law since 1949 and 1977, and 
enjoy universal acceptance since 2006. Crimes against humanity were defined by Nuremberg Charter, but 
the understanding of when they can happen, whether or not in connection with an armed conflict, and what 
acts constitute these crimes, became the subject of widening argument not only among the judges of the 
ICTY, but within broader academic circles. Violations of the laws and customs of war were defined in the 
IV Hague Convention in 1907. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 1907. Available at:  
http://www.yale.org/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm. Accessed on 7 January 2008. 
55 Statute of the ICTY, Article 7 (1).  
56 Ibid., Article 7 (2).  
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thereof.”57 As in Nuremberg, the fact that an accused person acted under an order of a 
Government or of a superior officer did not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility 
but provided him or her with a mitigation of punishment.58  
 
2.1.4. Achievements of the Tribunal  
 
In its work, the ICTY reached several important decisions, which had a significant impact 
on the development of international criminal and international humanitarian law. One of 
the first decisions of the ICTY implied a broadening of the definition of the crimes 
against humanity.  
Crimes against humanity were defined by the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg, but although the Charter envisaged these crimes to be punished 
whether they were committed before or during the war, the judges at Nuremberg actually 
refused to convict Nazis for crimes committed against Jews in Germany in the period 
before 1939.59 The creators of the ICTY Statute at first went down the same path as the 
Nuremberg judges, but in its Decision on the Defence Motion for interlocutory appeal on 
jurisdiction in the case of Dusan Tadic, in October 1995, the Appeals Chamber firmly 
established an opinion that “it is by now a settled rule of customary international law that 
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict. 
Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary international law may not require a 
connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.”60  
                                                 
57 Ibid., Article 7 (3). 
58 Ibid., Article 7 (4).  
59 “The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against 
humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were 
committed on a vast scale, which were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts 
charged in the Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they 
were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted 
crimes against humanity.” Nuremberg judgment, Persecution of the Jews, 30 September and 1 October 
1946.  
60 Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par.141. The 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Dusko Tadic. Case No IT-94-1-A. 
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In addition to this important conclusion, the Appeal Chamber in the same case also 
broadened the understanding in the Statute of the ICTY that war crimes can happen only 
during an international armed conflict. The perception was that these kinds of violations 
comprise only the violations of international rules of war conduct and international armed 
conflict, but are not applicable in internal conflicts.61 The Appeals Chamber’s decision in 
the Tadic case changed the usual perception by establishing that war crimes can be 
committed in internal armed conflicts, defining that “an armed conflict exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts 
and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is 
reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that 
moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply on the whole territory of the 
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of 
a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”62 These two decisions of the 
ICTY, although not in the Statute of the ICTY, broadened the definition of crimes against 
humanity and of war crimes, and will have an important consequence for future 
prosecutions of crimes committed either in an international conflict or during a civil 
strife.  
Probably one of the most important achievements of the ICTY and its most significant 
case was the trial of Slobodan Milošević, the first head of state to be prosecuted for 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.63 The trial of Slobodan 
                                                 
61 Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par.70. The 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Dusko Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A,  
par. 96-127.62 Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, 
par.70. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Dusko Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A, par.70. 
62 Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par.70. The 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Dusko Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A, par.70. 
63 Although one of the first objections was that he could not be prosecuted because of his right to sovereign 
immunity, since he was the President of Serbia and Yugoslavia, this was immediately excluded since the 
article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute did not allow for sovereign immunity. His other objections, the argument 
on unlawfulness of the ICTY, because it was established by the Security Council and not by General 
Assembly, was rejected as unsustainable since the Security Council acted under the power of Chapter VII 
of the Charter.  As for the claim of unlawfulness of his transfer, since the Constitutional Court of Serbia 
declared the transfer of Slobodan Milosevic was illegal since the Constitution of Serbia did not allow for 
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Milošević, began in February 2002, and lasted until his death in March 2006.64 However, 
although unfinished, this trial was one of the most serious events in  international justice 
– it opened the door for other heads of state to face similar charges, and therefore has 
become a significant precedent.  
 
2.2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa 
 
The first institution that involved perpetrators in a process of dealing with past crimes and 
aimed at securing their acknowledgement of past political atrocities was the SATRC.  
 
After almost 50 years of apartheid and centuries of racial domination in South Africa, the 
country entered a process of transition to democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
path to democracy was impossible without addressing the crimes from the past – crimes 
committed by a state system instigated with a purpose to preserve domination of whites 
over non-whites in South Africa. Apartheid was long before defined as crimes against 
humanity by international community. The United Nations General Assembly defined 
apartheid as a crime against humanity for the first time in 196665, and went beyond this in 
later resolutions, which declared apartheid as a violation of the UN Charter.66 Apartheid 
enforced the system of white domination over the non-white population of South Africa 
on political, social, economical, residential, educational, territorial basis.67     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the transfer of Serbian citizens to other country, this was also rejected as unsustainable, since the ICTY is 
the UN court (and not any other country’s). 
64 There are certain issues in respect of which the Milošević trial were criticized. Firstly, there was the 
length of the trial, due to the overloaded indictments. A second problem was presented by the decision of 
the Trial Chamber to hear all three indictments (for crimes in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia) together, which 
among other things, seriously slowed down the trial. The trial was marked by a series of tragic misfortunes 
which caused delays, including the death of the presiding judge, Richard May; and the defendant’s constant 
bad health manifested in his high blood pressure and poor heart condition, which made the Trial Chamber 
decide to sit only three days per week, as it wanted to give the defendant four days per week to rest and 
recover. 
65 General Assembly,The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, (16 
December 1966), 2202A (XXI).   
66 General Assembly, International Convention on the Suppression  of the Crime of Apartheid, (30 
November 1973), 3068 (XXVIII)., This resolution came into force on 18 July 1976. 
67 Alex Boraine, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: The third way”, in Truth 
V.Justice: The morality of truth commissions, edited by Robert I Rothberg and Dennis Thompson, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000),  141.  
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To the crimes of apartheid were added the state crimes and human rights violations 
during the decades of anti-apartheid conflict following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. 
However, the need for a peaceful transition after decades of conflict and human rights 
violations, resulted in a negotiated settlement and South Africa emerged with a creative 
model to address past state crimes. The first model proposed, that of blanket amnesty, 
preferred by political, military and police representatives of the former regime, was 
rejected by representatives of African National Congress (ANC).68 The second option, 
that of the ‘Nuremberg model’ of prosecution and trials was more acceptable to the 
liberation movement; however, prosecutions of all those responsible for crimes during 
apartheid were perceived as impossible, due to several reasons. Firstly, it was 
acknowledged by many from the ANC leadership that the ‘Nuremberg’ approach could 
jeopardize the prospects for a peaceful transition through negotiations.69 Secondly, peace 
itself would be in danger, since security forces that were securing the negotiation process 
and first democratic elections were against any kind of prosecutions.70 Thirdly, the whole 
institutional system of apartheid was not dismantled before the democratic elections and 
majority of judges, prosecutors and police officers were still those who were appointed 
by the apartheid regime and in majority, helped maintaining this system of inequality and 
institutional human rights violations. Relying on them to conduct criminal investigations 
against politicians, army and police members who committed those violations would 
present a great danger to the prospects of securing fair trials and possible convictions.71  
 
Therefore, the third model was adopted, the one that did not make anyone fully satisfied, 
but was a result of a compromise – a truth and reconciliation commission, with two major 
characteristics. Its first goal was to establish truth relying on statements of victims and 
witnesses, and victims’ voices heard at public hearings.72 Its second objective was to give 
conditional amnesty to perpetrators in exchange for truth.73 It can be argued that these 
                                                 
68 Ibid, 143. 
69 Alexander L.Boraine, “South Africa’s Amnesty Revisited”, in The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, 
Justice and Impunity, edited by Charles Villa-Vicencio and Eric Doxtader (Cape Town: Institute for Justice 
and Reconciliation, 2003),170-172. 
70 Ibid, 172. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, article 3.1.(a). 
73 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, art.3.1.(b). 
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objectives were designed to help restoring the dignity of victims and survivors and allow 
society to begin healing and reconciling. It is also important to stress that the second 
feature of the TRC - amnesty - was vital for the peace process in South Africa.74 The 
amnesty issue was perceived as crucial for the success of the South African peaceful 
transition, that some argue that in this case it was not a question, whether amnesty would 
be implemented, but the type and extent of it.75 
 
The crucial role of amnesty in the reconciliation process presented such an important part 
of establishing democracy in South Africa that the Postamble of the Interim Constitution 
in 1993, entitled ‘National Unity and Reconciliation’, defined that the divisions from the 
past, marked with human rights violations and injustices can be resolved only ‘on the 
basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation 
but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation.’76 In order to achieve 
that, ‘amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with 
political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.’77 Parliament 
was given the power to adopt a law that would determine the mechanisms, criteria and 
procedures through which amnesty shall be dealt.78  
 
After many debates and discussions, not only within South Africa, but also through 
learning from other countries that went through similar experiences, such as Chile and 
Argentine, the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar announced the formation of a truth 
commission.79 It was agreed that the most suitable model for South Africa to deal with 
the past wrongdoings and injustices shall be the SATRC. The process that led to the 
adoption of the legislation was open, transparent and inclusive, unprecedented in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
74 Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process (Antwerp-Oxford: 
Internsentia, 2004), 32.  
75 Ibid., 35. 
76 Interim Constitution of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Alex Boraine, “Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: The third way”, 145.  
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previous examples of truth commissions.80 One of the things that differentiated this 
commission from previous examples was the very active role that civil society played 
during the selection process, but also in discussing the model of the future commission.81 
 
The bill establishing the SATRC was adopted in Parliament in June 1995, and President 
Nelson Mandela signed it into law in July 1995.82 After a few months of selection of 
commissioners’, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act came into effect 
in mid-December 1995, when the SATRC was established and set to work.83 
 
Its main goal was to promote national unity in South Africa and reconciliation in order to 
overcome the conflicts and divisions from the past. It was to be achieved through 
“establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 
1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of 
such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives and 
perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations, by 
conducting investigations and holding hearings”84. Another important power given to the 
TRC in order to achieve its goals, was the power to grant an amnesty to persons “who 
make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political 
objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period”.85 
The Commission was also given power to provide victims with an opportunity to narrate 
the violations they suffered through “establishing and making known the fate or 
whereabouts of victims and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such victims by 
granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they 
are the victims, and by recommending reparation measures in respect of them”.86 The 
                                                 
80 One of the most important criticism was the decision of President Mandela to appoint two commissioners 
that were not shortlisted by the selection panel. Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks, 57, Boraine, A Country 
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TRC was suppose to fulfil its goals by “compiling a report providing as comprehensive 
an account as possible of the activities and findings of the Commission (…) and which 
contains recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of human 
rights.”87 
 
The Commission had three main sub-committees, the Committee on Human Rights 
Violations, with the task to investigate human rights violations, the Committee on 
Reparation and Rehabilitation, with a task to deal with matters in relation to reparations 
and the Committee on Amnesty.88 Unlike the first two, which were composed of 
commissioners appointed by the chairperson of the SATRC, Desmond Tutu, the Amnesty 
Committee was firstly composed of three judges appointed by President of South Africa 
and presided over by one of them, and two commissioners that were appointed after 
consultation with the SATRC.89 By the end of the amnesty process, the Committee was 
expanded with 19 more people, judges, advocates and attorneys to deal with the amount 
of work the Committee was facing.90 The Committee on Amnesty was given strong 
powers – to grant an amnesty from criminal prosecution if an applicant fulfils certain 
conditions. However, unlike any other commission before this one, who acted after, or 
resulted in a blanket amnesty91, the South African model of amnesty became a synonym 
for an accountable or conditional amnesty.92   
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Chapter 3 – Background to plea bargaining and conditional amnesty  
3.1. Background to plea bargaining 
3.1.1. History of plea bargaining 
                 
Plea bargaining is usually understood as negotiation at a court of law over 
dropping some of the charges of the indictment, reduction of charges or reduction 
of sentence in exchange for admission of guilt, giving up an appeal or providing 
cooperation and/or information to the prosecutor in another criminal case as a 
witness. The practice of plea bargaining began in adversarial legal systems, but it 
is gaining more attention in civil-law countries with inquisitorial systems.93  
 
A plea bargaining practice was first introduced in courts of law primarily as a tool 
to deal with the practical problems that prosecutors faced, such as overwhelming 
caseloads, efforts to increase efficiency in order to make time for other issues, 
obtaining additional information from defendants who pleaded guilty, etc.94 The 
practice of plea bargaining emerged in Anglo-American jurisdictions, but was 
relatively rare until the second half of the 19th century.95  
 
The practice of accepting guilty pleas originally emerged in England in the 17th 
century as a tool for mitigating excessively harsh punishments.96 There is no clear 
agreement among scholars as to what the main reason was that stood behind the 
usage of plea bargaining in adversarial systems. While jurists usually consider 
extensive caseload as the main reason for the introduction of the practice of plea 
bargaining, many historians consider that plea bargaining was a response to 
                                                 
93 Italy is the country that showed most interest in applying and adjusting the practice of plea bargaining 
within its domestic system. Stefano Maffei, “Negotiations on ‘Evidence’ and Negotiations on ‘Sentence’”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 1050/1069.  
94 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining Triumph: A history of plea bargaining in America (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 40-62.   
95 Nancy Amoury Combs, “Copping a Plea to Genocide: the Plea Bargaining of International Crimes”, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.151, No.1 (2002):12. 
96 James E.Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas (New York: C.Boardman Co., 1975), in: Combs, 
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“increasingly complex trial procedure.”97  According to Combs, changes that 
occurred in English criminal procedure 18th century - the defendants were 
eliminated as a testimonial resource, the dominance of evidentiary objections, and 
the development of the privilege against self-discrimination -- all contributed to 
the increasing complexity of the adversarial system.98 All of these, supported by 
expert witnesses testimonies and cross examination of witnesses transformed 
speedy and efficient trials into a time-consuming and complex system, thus 
presenting a fertile ground for the introduction of plea bargaining.99  
 
On the other hand, the practice of plea bargaining emerged in the mid-19th century 
in the United States of America, as a result of “the caseload boom”, which was 
caused by the tremendous growth of crime, as George Fisher argues, and perhaps 
as a result of improved policing methods, which produced more arrests, that led to 
more prosecutions, while more defendants began to exercise their right to appeal 
from lower tribunals to higher instances, as well as coming to the court with 
lawyers.100  All of these factors had a significant impact on already burdened 
public prosecutors. Fisher also argues that prosecutors’ case-load was over-
burdened since the majority of them worked as part-time public prosecutors and 
gained only part-time salaries, if any for their service. Therefore, they had strong 
reasons to embrace the practice of plea bargaining.101  
 
The first cases in which plea bargaining was deployed were cases involving liquor 
and alcohol.102 The reason for this was that only in liquor cases prosecutors had 
the power “to dictate sentences by manipulating charges”,103 so that this did not 
depend only on judges. The decision to introduce plea bargaining in liquor cases 
was also possibly accelerated by the fact that most of these cases were victimless 
cases – if there was no injured party which could intervene and refuse bargained 
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justice, a plea bargain was more possible.104 However, since plea bargaining was 
also practiced in murder cases, though to a far lesser extent, it can be argued that 
the prosecutor’s ability to manipulate sentencing was a sufficient condition for 
charge bargaining, or to exercise their right not to prosecute.105   
 
In contrast to the prosecutors, judges were somehow reluctant to accept this newly 
established practice and their unwillingness accounted for the lack of plea 
bargaining in cases other than liquor or murder.106 At the outset of the practice of 
plea bargaining, judges were generally not involved. One of the reasons was 
surely the fact that they did not have the same workload, since they could process 
only as many cases as prosecutors could present to them. On the contrary, since in 
liquor cases prosecutors could promise to obtain a reduction of sentence through a 
manipulation of the charges, judges were troubled in engaging in practice which 
touched on “a symbol of judges’ great authority and esteem” which sentencing 
power certainly was.107  
 
The interest of the third party of the plea bargaining process, defendants, lay in a 
simple difference between possible severe sentence if a defendant was found 
guilty or a more lenient sentence promised by the prosecutor if a defendant 
pleaded guilty.  Defendants with a legal counsel could possibly get a form of 
concession from a prosecutor, but only in liquor cases. In cases with capital 
charges, such as murder, or rape, the practice of plea bargaining did not evolve 
until the mid-1800s, since pleading guilty for these charges almost surely meant 
death. However, improved policing and evidence gathering increased the number 
of convictions in capital cases, which could account for the increase in guilty 
pleas for these cases around the 1850s.108 Another important change happened in 
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the mid- 19th century – the prosecutors were stripped of the power to charge-
bargain with defendants, and therefore could not promise anything.109  
 
The history of plea-bargaining in continental or inquisitorial systems is somewhat 
different. While the adversarial system has the form of a contest between two 
opposing sides which present the evidence to a passive and neutral judge who 
establishes facts, the inquisitorial system is a form of inquiry led by a judge, based 
on the collection of evidences compiled by government officials who conducted 
the investigation.110 Unlike the Anglo-American system, the continental system is 
more focused on establishing the truth and, compared to the adversarial system, 
considerably faster and more efficient, which could be the reason why the practice 
of plea bargaining never developed to the same extent as in adversarial legal 
systems.111 In most continental systems, plea bargaining still does not exist – a 
trial is held even after a defendant has made a full confession of guilt. Several 
other features of continental system also contribute to the conclusion that this 
system does not allow for pure plea bargaining as it exists in adversarial system. 
First of all, prosecutors in the continental system are granted a lesser amount of 
discretional powers than in adversarial system, and are bound by law in certain 
countries to prosecute all serious crimes.112 However, certain European countries 
have changed their own systems by including more adversarial features.113 France 
and Netherlands have certain features of plea bargaining, but only in less serious 
crimes while Germany has adopted a bargaining over confessions in either non-
violent crimes and/or complicated financial and drug cases.114  
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The introduction of adversarial system features, such as a form of a plea 
bargaining in continental systems were a result of both a rise of petty crime and 
financial crimes, and reforms adopted either voluntarily or imposed by the 
European Court of Human Rights.115  
However, these examples do not mean that the practice of plea bargaining is 
firmly established in the continental system, and plea bargaining in most 
continental systems is limited to petty crime, and is not permitted in most serious 
or violent crimes.116     
 
3.1.2 Values and problems of plea bargaining   
 
One of the most important, if not the most significant value of the plea bargaining 
practice is its contribution to the efficiency of trials. At least, this factor was 
crucial in determining two out of three court actors interest in plea bargaining: 
prosecutors and judges were interested in making courts work more effectively 
and lessening the caseload pressure on a court. After prosecutors introduced this 
practice to ease their underpaid work in order to have enough time to deal with 
more lucrative activities, judges, pressed with the same challenge, also engaged in 
the sentence bargaining.117     
 
Another important motive for accepting plea bargaining by judges and 
prosecutors was that of victory in the trial.118 Prosecutors’ usage of plea 
bargaining secured them with victories in cases, and judges supported plea 
bargaining because it secured them from appeals and reversal of trials.119 The 
increased number of appeals and more reversals of trials persuaded judges and 
prosecutors of the usefulness of plea bargaining - for prosecutors more appeals 
meant more prosecutorial work, while reversal brought reputational damages to 
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judges, “prosecutor and trial judge valued it as a means to guard their reputations 
from the scent of fecklessness or incompetence.”120 As for criminal defendants, 
plea bargaining was the safe tool to escape uncertainty and avoid the strictest 
sentences. Through plea bargaining the system protects itself from factual and 
legal errors121, the defendant eliminates any formal doubt of guilt by 
acknowledging it, and by repudiating the right to trial and the right to complaint, 
there is no possibility to any court declaring error on the appeal.  
 
Plea bargaining was thus adopted in the mid-19th century as a practice to ease the 
work of court of prosecutors and it was slowly and somewhat reluctantly accepted 
by judges, defenders and defendants.122 Now, plea bargaining has become so 
dominant among other mechanisms in adversarial judicial systems, that a 1992 
survey showed that guilty pleas accounted for 92% of all convictions in state 
courts,123 while according to the United States Supreme Court Reports, 95% of all 
criminal convictions are reached by admissions of guilt.124  
 
While we can argue that plea bargaining has become accepted as a practice 
mainly to ease the work of different court actors, there is and always was a 
number of serious controversies following the employment of the practice of plea 
bargaining. Among them, one of the most important was whether plea bargaining 
practice may not actually violate the rights of defendants who are pleading guilty. 
When agreeing to plead guilty, a defendant is actually giving up the right to trial, 
one of the most important civic rights.125 The question that needs to be posed is 
under which conditions we can reject this criticism – how we can secure that 
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waiving one of the most important rights, such as the right to trial, is done in a 
legal and rightful manner? There are several arguments posed in the literature 
regarding this legal challenge, and most of them encompass the precondition that 
plea bargaining needs to be made knowingly and voluntarily.126 In practice, this 
means that the person who is waiving his or her right to trial and enters a plea 
agreement is not coerced into the agreement and that he or she understands the 
significance of the guilty plea.127 The standard is that the person that is entering a 
plea agreement should be advised about the nature of the charges against him or 
her, and given an accurate advice on the consequences if he or she enters a plea 
agreement.128 
 
3.2. From blanket amnesty to conditional amnesty 
 
 
Amnesty has long been accepted as a means to resolve different kinds of issues in 
societies throughout human history. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the focus 
shall be on amnesties that were introduced in order to resolve disputes between 
conflicting sides following war and civil conflict and mostly was implemented in order to 
pacify situations of ongoing violence, or show clemency to enemies in order to create 
peaceful future. One of the first such amnesties was introduced in ancient Greece, when 
amnesty was implemented in Athens to resolve issues from the civil war.129 Ever since 
then, throughout history, it presented a legitimate tool for the resolution of conflicting 
situations. In the 20th century, amnesty became, especially during the 1970s, in Latin 
American countries under dictatorial regimes, what Louise Joinet called ‘a symbol of 
freedom’, since it was seen as a tool for the liberation of political prisoners.130 However, 
as soon as democratic transitions in these countries began, amnesty turned into a tool to 
avoid accountability and ‘to protect individuals from accountability for some of the worst 
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human rights atrocities in the history of humankind’.131 As Louise Joinet argued in the 
report Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and 
political) that she prepared for the UN Commission on Human Rights: “Amnesty, the 
symbol of freedom, was more and more seen as a kind of "insurance on impunity" with 
the emergence, then proliferation, of "self-amnesty" laws proclaimed by declining 
military dictatorships anxious to arrange their own impunity while there was still 
time.”132 It can be argued, as Samuel Huntington pointed out, that what happened during 
this period ‘was shaped almost exclusively by politics, by the nature of the 
democratization process, and by the distribution of political power during and after the 
transition’.133 According to Huntington, there are several reasons why in this wave of 
democratization, amnesties were acceptable: first, the majority of pre-1990 
democratizations were ‘transformations’, where reformists in positions of power in 
authoritarian regimes initiated liberalisation; secondly, even in the case of replacement of 
old regimes, members of the old regimes could seriously jeopardize newly elected 
democratic governments, in the case of potential prosecutions; and thirdly, the issue of 
amnesty was part of a negotiated settlement between old and new regimes.134 In several 
countries in Latin America members of military juntas, anticipating democratic 
transitions and their own ouster from power, proclaimed amnesty laws, trying to prevent 
potential prosecutions for abuses they were responsible for. In some other countries, as in 
Uruguay, new democratic governments declared amnesty after the democratic 
transition.135 Augusto Pinochet imposed a general amnesty for all the crimes and human 
rights violations committed by military and security forces prior to that time.136 This self-
amnesty law and other factors, such as the strong political role that Pinochet still  played 
in post-transitional Chile, as well as unreformed military forces, prevented prosecutions 
and accountability for crimes committed during the military rule era. Argentina also 
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struggled with the issue of amnesty, which after some early prosecution initiative in the 
mid-1980s, prevented prosecutions of those responsible for crimes committed during the 
period of the military junta.137 
 
However, with the increased role of the human rights movement, amnesties for human 
rights violations, as in Argentina or Chile, have been evaluated as unacceptable. As 
Ronald Slye argues, those that objected the use of amnesties have focused on 
international law, customary international law, and decisions by international and 
regional tribunals.138 Their main argument is that amnesties are unacceptable under 
international law, since there are numerous international treaties that precisely define that 
states have obligations to prosecute those responsible for human rights violations.139 The 
four Geneva Conventions (1949) provide that “Each High Contracting Party shall be 
under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered 
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their 
nationality, before its own courts” or else extradite them for trial in another 
jurisdiction.140 In addition to this, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (1948) prescribes that “the Contracting Parties confirm that 
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish”.141 The Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 
proscribes that “an order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked 
as a justification of torture”142 and also obliges its signatories to make all acts of torture 
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offences under their national criminal law, and to arrest, punish or extradite 
perpetrators143. 
 
However, there have been different types of amnesties, and democratic transitions or 
transitions from conflict to peace, which demanded some kind of amnesty, in order to 
prevent the resurgence of the conflict and abuses. Ronald Slye defines four types of 
amnesties, applied until now: amnesic amnesties, compromise amnesties, corrective 
amnesties, and accountable amnesties.144   
 
The first type, amnesic amnesties are those that are usually blanket self-amnesties, whose 
main characteristics are ‘concealment and anonymity’. Persons covered by this type of 
amnesty are usually not identified, but treated as part of the group, such as members of 
the army, or security forces, and this type of amnesty does not provide any information 
about the crimes, for which the amnesty is instigated. They apply to their recipients 
‘regardless of their specific motive or objective and identify eligible persons through 
group characteristics’. And as Slye argued, ‘amnesic amnesties provide no relief to 
victims, and correspondingly impose burdens on victims’, ‘they are not a genuine 
expression of societal grace or forgiveness’, and mostly, they are not ‘remedial, and may 
be designed to diminish an armed conflict or civil unrest’.145  
 
The second type of amnesty, compromise amnesty can also be the result of a compromise 
of conflicting sides in ending a conflict or replacing a regime responsible for human 
rights violations, and they can provide some form of redress.146  
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The third type of amnesty is corrective amnesty, which is designed to either pacify a 
situation after a conflict, or correct a previous injustice. As Slye pointed out, the first type 
‘usually occurs after a dramatic change in the social and political environment; for 
example, the lifting of a state of emergency, or the end of an internal or international 
armed conflict’, while the other is ‘a reversal of an injustice-an injustice created by an 
illegitimate law, or by mistaken or fabricated facts’, usually in situation where political 
opponents were prosecuted for political reasons.147 However, Slye rightly argues that the 
second type of corrective amnesty is in its nature illegitimate: “granting amnesty to a 
prisoner of opinion is tantamount to an implicit acknowledgment that his conduct was 
criminal, whereas it is really the authority responsible for the penalty, being guilty of 
unlawful detention, [that] might be granted amnesty. The proper remedy for such an 
injustice is the reversing of a judgment or retroactively repealing an illegitimate law”.148  
 
And finally, the fourth type of amnesty that Slye defines is an accountable amnesty. This 
type of amnesty provides a form of  accountability and a measure of relief to victims. 
Slye stipulates the following conditions for an amnesty to be defined as accountable: 
“First, it must be democratic in its creation. (…) Second, it must not apply to 
those most responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious 
violations of international criminal law. Third, it must impose some form of 
public procedure or accountability on its recipients (…) Fourth, it must provide an 
opportunity for victims to question and challenge an individual's claim to 
amnesty. Such an opportunity could be, but need not be, in a public forum. Fifth, 
it must provide some concrete benefit, usually in the form of reparations, to 
victims. (…) Sixth, and finally, it must be designed to facilitate a transition to a 
more human rights friendly regime, or as part of a comprehensive program of 
reconciliation aimed at addressing long-standing and serious societal tensions and 
injustices.”149 
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This type of amnesty is considered accountable since it is individual, looking at 
beneficiaries individually, and not as part of the group. They do not cover war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or other serious violations of international criminal law. They 
are restricted to acts which were committed with a particular motive or objective. They 
usually follow or are designed together with other state initiatives to address human 
rights violations, providing a form of a remedy for victims, contribute to the process of 
establishing truth and serve the process of reconciliation.150  
 
This type of amnesty are not the result of compromised justice, although they might seem 
as such. However, although they serve to avoid formal and legal punishment, ‘they are 
more likely to provide an admission and acknowledgment from a perpetrator than a 
traditional trial’.151 
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Chapter 4 - Plea bargaining practice at the ICTY 
 
4.1. Causes of introducing plea bargaining at the ICTY 
 
In 2001, the ICTY, based on a hybrid of the common-law and civil-law systems, began to 
experiment with the practice of plea bargaining. Initially the practice had been rejected by 
ICTY representatives. The first President of the ICTY, Judge Antonio Cassese, explained 
what reasons stood behind the decision to reject the use of plea bargaining in the 
beginning at the existence of the ICTY:  
 
“The question of the grant of immunity from prosecution to a potential witness 
has also generated considerable debate. (…)However, we always have to keep in 
mind that this Tribunal is not a municipal criminal court but one that is charged 
with the task of trying person accused of the gravest possible of all crimes. The 
persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, 
sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhumane acts. After 
due reflection we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution 
for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise 
be.”152  
 
The practice of plea bargaining was rejected by the majority of the Tribunal 
officials at the beginning as being clearly incompatible with the goals of the 
ICTY. Its leaders at the time considered that the Tribunal had been created as a 
mainly retributive mechanism for prosecuting those responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian law that would ‘contribute to  ensuring  that  such  
violations are  halted  and  effectively  redressed’.153  
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Despite this, the first ‘guilty plea’ was entered by Dražen Erdemović in May 
1996, though not as a result of any negotiations between the prosecutor and 
defence.154 The first guilty plea resulting from negotiations between the defendant 
and the prosecutor was the guilty plea entered by Stevan Todorović in the case of 
Bosanski Šamac. In this case, the prosecutor did not only bargain over sentence, 
but introduced the concept of charge bargaining.155 Beside Erdemović and 
Todorović, another four accused pleaded guilty or negotiated pleas with the 
Office of the Prosecutor until December 2001, when the rule 62ter, which set up 
the procedure of plea bargaining, was adopted by the permanent judges of the 
ICTY into the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.156 The practice of charges and 
sentence bargaining between the prosecutor and defendants became the usual and 
fully accepted practice of the court, mandated to prosecute most serious violations 
of human rights in former Yugoslavia.  
While the practice of plea bargaining had been rejected as unacceptable at the 
beginning of the ICTY’s work, after 2001 it became one of the most prevalent 
powers that the prosecution used in handling the at the ICTY. The practice was 
initially unacceptable as being in contradiction with the mandate of the ICTY.157 
As Michael Scharf argues, “[t]he crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction were 
simply seen as too reprehensible to be bargained over”.158 The mandate of the 
ICTY was established for “the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991” in order to “put an end to such 
crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
154 Erdemović’s plea was not a result of the traditional plea negotiations with the Office of the Prosecutor, 
since he made a voluntary confession of his guilt in his first appearance. Statement of Dražen Erdemović at 
the hearing of 31 May 1996, pg.26 of English provisional transcript. Available at:  
http://www.un.org/icty/transe22/960531ID.htm. Accessed on: 06 March 2008. 
155 Decision on Prosecution Motion to withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to withdraw 
pending Motions, Prosecutor v.Stevan Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9-PT,  
156 Rule 62ter. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY. (28 February 2008),  IT/32/Rev. 41.   
157 Scharf, “Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea Bargaining and International Tribunals”: 1071.  
158 Ibid.  
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responsible for them”, and finally to “contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace”.159 However, after a relatively slow beginning when the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY was able to prosecute only low level perpetrators and 
several mid level officers more accused were arrested and transferred to the ICTY 
following the democratic changes in Croatia and former Yugoslavia in 2000,. 
Pressured by an increased number of cases to prosecute, and facing complicated 
trials of the most senior political leaders, such as Slobodan Milosevic former 
president of Yugoslavia and Serbia, Biljana Plavšić, member of the collective and 
expanded Presidencies of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and many others, the 
practice of plea bargaining began to be an accepted practice at the ICTY.  
After the democratic changes in Croatia in 1999 and Serbia in 2000, the new 
democratic governments began arresting and transferring persons indicted at the 
ICTY. New governments in these countries were under serious pressure from the 
international community which made cooperation with the ICTY, especially 
arrests and transfer of indicted persons a compulsory prerequisite for the 
necessary financial support and potential integration into the European Union. 
That significantly increased the number of persons transferred from the region 
and facing prosecutions at the ICTY.160  
In addition to this, the ICTY faced a serious pressure from the international 
community, and especially the United States, the main donor of the court, which 
insisted that the ICTY finish its work by the end of 2010, which required the 
Tribunal to complete all investigations by the end of 2004, all trial activities at 
first instance by the end of 2008, and all work by 2010.161  
Together with the increased number of cases, the complexity of crimes for 
which persons were indicted presented an additional problem facing ICTY 
prosecutors. The crimes processed at the ICTY encompass cases with tens of 
                                                 
159 Security Council Resolution 827, (25 May1993), S/RES/827.   
160 Until the end of 2000, only four cases against four indictees were completed by Trial and Appeals 
Chambers, and 12 more perpetrators were in the process before the Appeals Chambers.  
161 Scharf, , “Trading Justice for Efficiency”:  6; Julian A.Cook, III, “Plea Bargaining at The Hague”, Yale 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, (2005): 475.    
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thousands of dead civilians and soldiers, and forcible displacement of millions of 
people in the former Yugoslavia. As Tieger and Shin argued, “with such a vast 
crime base, even the most rigorous selection of the 'most serious' of cases would 
significantly burden an entire national judicial system for a lengthy period.”162 
Specifically, the Tribunal had to process very complicated cases of political 
leaders, with a huge crime base in large geographic areas, lengthy time periods 
and countless victims.163 This kind of cases presented significant financial, 
temporal and staffing challenges to the ICTY’s capacity, and proved to be 
extremely costly and time-consuming.164 As one scholar pointed out, “Tribunal 
proceedings consequently take forever and cost the moon”.165 One of the 
additional problems that arose during the trials of political and military leaders 
were the investigations of complex links between perpetrators, formal and 
informal chains of commands, usually exacerbated by the lack of documentary 
evidences.  Access to witnesses was also limited because of “a continuing climate 
of intimidation and fear, domestic political hostility to cooperation with the 
Tribunal, and even bureaucratic obstacles”.166 
Following the introduction of this practice to the ICTY, different groups, from 
victims association to human rights organization, raised serious criticisms of the 
Tribunal for plea bargaining with perpetrators. A first criticism was that plea 
bargaining practice was simply incompatible with the nature of crimes that were 
prosecuted at the ICTY - crimes which the Tribunal was tasked to prosecute were 
perceived as ‘egregious’, and for persons indicted for these crimes to have a 
chance to receive lenient sentences through plea bargaining was inconceivable 
and inappropriate for a war crimes tribunal.167 There has been criticism that this 
practice could jeopardize the establishment of an accurate historical record by the 
                                                 
162 Tieger and Shin, “Plea Agreements in the ICTY”: 668.  
163 Only the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic encompassed the time period between 1991 and 1999, 
three areas of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (Kosovo), and dozens of thousands of victims. 
164 Tieger and Shin, “Plea Agreements in the ICTY”: 668.  
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Tribunal.168 There were also some concerns that introduction of the plea 
agreement practice, which was unfamiliar to defense attorneys coming from the 
former Yugoslavia, could jeopardize due process.169 
On the other hand, those who supported the practice argued that the plea 
bargaining practice secured the criminal responsibility of each of those who 
pleaded guilty for egregious crimes. Additionally, persons entering a guilty plea 
agreed to testify against other persons indicted before the ICTY, providing 
valuable accounts of the crimes.170  
Taken together the above considerations, especially combined with the 
practical reasons for resolving the burden of costly, complicated, time and staff 
consuming trials overcame the critics, made plea bargaining, a solution for the 
ICTY to deal with the problems of caseload volume and complex cases. 
4.2. Plea bargaining process at the ICTY – Procedure  
 
The eventual procedure and rules regarding the plea bargaining practice were 
adopted and developed by establishing and then developing precedents in the 
course of the actual proceedings of the ICTY.  
 
Thus already in 1996, Dražen Erdemović, a soldier of the Bosnian Serb Army 
pleaded guilty and confessed his participation in genocide and killings of Bosniak 
men and boys in the eastern Bosnian city of Srebrenica in July 1995. Following 
him, Goran Jelisić, the former commander of camp Luka, one of the Bosnian 
Serbs’ most notorious camps, pleaded guilty for some of the crimes he was 
indicted for. These two instances only involved negotiations over 
recommendations for the sentences that the accused was supposed to receive. 171 
 
                                                 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., 501. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Nancy Amoury Combs, Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative Justice 
Approach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 60-62 
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In the cases of another 18 defendants who pleaded guilty at the ICTY, guilty pleas 
came as a result of charge bargaining – when prosecutors agreed not to include 
certain crimes in the indictment of the accused, or dismissed charges that were 
already part of the indictment in order to obtain the acussed’s guilty plea.172 Using 
this procedure, the 18 defendants pleaded guilty at the ICTY.173 Among these 
persons were mostly army and police officials, commanders of camps, but also 
prominent political leaders of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs.   
 
The rule 62bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY stipulated the 
necessary conditions for accepting the guilty plea from the defendant, following 
the confessions of previously mentioned defendants – Dražen Erdemović and 
Goran Jelisić. They both confessed some of the crimes they were responsible for, 
and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, entered into negotiations with them. 
Both were sentenced for crimes to which they had confessed – Dražen Erdemović 
was sentenced to five years imprisonment, while Goran Jelisić was sentenced to 
40 years imprisonment.  
                                                 
172 Ibid., 63 
173 Those were Milan Babić, Predrag Banović, Miroslav Bralo, Ranko Češić, Miroslav Deronjić, Damir 
Došen, Miodrag Jokić, Dragan Kolundžija, Darko Mrđa, Dragan Nikolić, Momir Nikolić, Dragan 
Obrenović, Biljana Plavšić, Ivica Rajić, Duško Sikirica, Milan Simić, Stevan Todorović, Dragan 
Zelenović. See: Prosecutor v.Milan Babić, (Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-03-72-A, (18 July 
2005); Prosecutor v.Predrag Banović, (Sentencing Judgement), IT-02-65/1-S (28 October 2003); 
Prosecutor v.Miroslav Bralo, (Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-95-17-A (2 April 2007); Prosecutor 
v. Ranko Češić, (Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-10/1-S (11 March 2004); Prosecutor v.Miroslav Deronjić, 
(Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-02-61-A (20 July 2005); Prosecutor v.Damir Došen et al 
(Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-8-S (13 November 2001);  
Prosecutor v.Miodrag Jokić, (Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-01-42/1-A (30 August 2005); 
Prosecutor v.Dragan Kolundžija et al (Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-8-S (13 November 2001);  
Prosecutor v.Darko Mrđa (Sentencing Judgement), IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004); Prosecutor v.Dragan 
Nikolić (Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-94-2-A (4 February 2005); Prosecutor v.Momir Nikolić 
(Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-02-60/1-A (8 March 2006); Prosecutor v.Dragan Obrenović 
(Sentencing Judgement), IT-02-60/2-S (10 December 2003); Prosecutor v.Biljana Blavšić (Sentencing 
Judgement), IT-00-39&40/1-S  (27 February 2003); Prosecutor v.Ivica Rajić (Sentencing Judgement), IT-
95-12-S (8 May 2006); Prosecutor v.Duško Sikirica et al (Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-8-S (13 
November 2001); Prosecutor v. Milan Simić (Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-9/2-S (17 October 
2002); Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović (Sentencing Judgement), IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001); Prosecutor 
v.Dragan Zelenović (Judgement on Sentencing Appeals), IT-96-23/2-A (31 October 2007). 
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Between 1997 and 1999, and due to some of the problems that arose during the 
Erdemovic and Jelisic cases, the judges of the ICTY refined the procedure  of plea 
bargaining:  
“If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to 
change his or her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that:  
(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;  
(ii) the guilty plea is informed;  
                                    (Amended 17 Nov 1999) 
(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and  
(iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused’s 
participation in it, either on the basis of independent indicia or on 
lack of any material disagreement between the parties about the 
facts of the case, the Trial Chamber may enter a finding of guilt 
and instruct the Registrar to set a date for the sentencing hearing. 
(Amended 10 July 1998, amended 4 Dec 1998).”174  
 
Another set of rules was adopted in order to regulate proceedings of plea 
bargaining and negotiations between an accused and the prosecutor. The rule 
62ter adopted in 2001 decided that the prosecutor and the defence may agree, 
after the accused enters a guilty plea, that the prosecutor can:   
“(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly; 
IT/32/Rev. 37 54 6 April 2006 
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate; 
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or 
sentencing range.”175 
 
However, additional  provision of the rule 62ter shows that judges of the ICTY 
were preserving their control over the implementation of plea bargaining practice 
at the international court charged with the duty to prosecute the most serious 
                                                 
174 Rule 62bis, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY. (28 February 2008),  IT/32/Rev. 41.   
175 Rule 62ter, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY. (28 February 2008),  IT/32/Rev. 41.  
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violations of international law. According to the B provision of the rule 62ter 
Trial Chambers shall not be bound by any agreement between the prosecutor and 
a defendant.176 In cases where a plea agreement had been reached by the parties, 
the Trial Chamber could require “the disclosure of the agreement in open session 
or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, at the time the accused pleads 
guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or her plea to 
guilty”.177 In the sentencing procedure in cases of guilty pleas the Prosecutor and 
the defence were empowered to submit any relevant information that can assist 
the Trial Chambers in deciding the appropriate sentence.178  
 
By far the most problematic provision of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is 
the rule 62ter (i), which gave authorization to the Office of the Prosecutor to 
amend the indictment in the process of plea bargaining with defendants, which 
had a charge bargaining as its consequence. It is natural and acceptable practice 
that in some cases, prosecutors may have the power to withdraw charges due to 
the problems with evidentiary deficiencies, or problems to secure reliable 
witnesses. However, in some of the cases before the ICTY this practice of the 
prosecutors had severe consequences and was heavily criticized. In three very 
important cases, against already mentioned Plavšić, but also two senior 
commanders of the Bosnian Serb Army, Momir Nikolić and Dragan Obrenović, 
prosecutors withdrew charges of genocide, the gravest of the crimes within the 
mandate of the ICTY, while these three defendants pleaded guilty for crimes 
against humanity. This had a serious impact on the plea bargaining process at the 
ICTY, which was very seriously criticized, not only by victims and human rights 
activist, but by the Trial Chambers of the ICTY as well. 
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Another provision for the plea bargaining process that caused many criticism was 
the sentence bargaining, which also experienced several phases. In the beginning, 
the sentences that were recommended by the ICTY prosecutor’s office were so 
modest and lenient, that as Combs argues, “it was not clear that there existed any 
sentencing differential between conviction after trial and conviction after a guilty 
plea”179. However, after several cases of quite moderate sentences imposed on 
some defendants, judges of the ICTY started practising their right not to be bound 
by agreement between the prosecutor and defendants, and a harsher policy in 
sentencing was practiced.180  
 
As the practice developed, several other features were included in the plea 
bargaining process at the ICTY. Firstly, and most importantly, the prosecutors 
demanded that some level of cooperation between defendant and prosecutors’ 
office has to be included. Defendants were asked to provide information in all 
cases that were connected to their case, and to testify against other defendants, 
therefore supporting prosecutions of other persons. 181 Additionally to that, the 
practice of public apologies and expression of remorse to victims of the crimes 
they admitted responsibility for, became a usual ritual at the ICTY.182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 Combs, Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law, 71. 
180 This was clearly shown in the case of Momir Nikolić, where the Trial Chamber decided not to impose 
sentence in accordance with recommendation of the Office of the Prosecutor, that suggested that Nikolić 
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Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law, 76-77. 
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Chapter 5 – Conditional amnesty at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa 
 
 
 
5.1. The Amnesty process at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa – Procedure 
 
According to the PNUR of 1995, the SATRC’s Amnesty Committee  had the power to 
offer a conditional amnesty “to persons who make full disclosure of all relevant facts”183, 
in relation to “an act associated with a political objective committed in the course of the 
conflicts of the past”184. Any person had a right to submit an application for amnesty, 
however, it was prescribed that the Committee would give priority to applicants who are 
in custody, after consultation with the Minister of Correctional Services.185 One of the 
most important features of the Amnesty Committee was that, with some stipulated 
exceptions, amnesty applications had to be heard at public hearings, and the Committee 
had an obligation to inform (besides the applicant) any victim or person implicated in a 
particular case of their right to be present at the hearing, to adduce evidence and to 
submit any article to be taken into consideration.186  
 
There were a number of criteria that needed to be met in order for an applicant to be 
granted amnesty. The Act prescribed that when: 
“(a) the application complies with the requirements of this Act;            
                                                                                 
  (b) the act, omission or offence to which the application relates is an act 
associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the 
past in accordance with the provisions of  subsections (2) and (3); and                                         
                                                                                 
                                                 
183 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995.. 
184 Article 20 (b), Ibid.  
185 Article 18, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995..  
186 Article 19 (4), Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995.  
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 (c) the applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts, it shall grant 
amnesty in respect of that act, omission or offence.”187                 
 
The Committee also took the following criteria into consideration when deciding on 
whether a particular act, omission or offence were associated with a political objective, 
starting with the motive of the person who committed the act, omission or offence and the 
context in which these occurred, as well whether these were committed ‘in the course of 
or as part of a political uprising, disturbance or event, or in reaction thereto’’.188 Besides 
that, the criteria were also ‘the legal and factual nature of the act, omission or offence, 
including the gravity of the act, omission or offence’ and the object or objective of the 
act, (…) and in particular whether the act, omission or offence was primarily directed at a 
political opponent or State property or personnel or against private property or 
individuals’.189 Particularly important criteria was whether the person who committed the 
act was a member, an agent or a supporter of the organisation, institution, liberation 
movement or body’ in the execution of an order of, or on behalf of, or with the approval 
of.190 It was also important that the act, offence or omission were not committed for 
personal gain or ‘out of personal malice, ill-will or spite, directed against the victim of 
the acts committed’.191                                                                
Important feature was that amnesty was defined as individual and not collective  – every 
applicant’s amnesty had to be considered on an individual basis.192 Applicants were 
divided into four categories –persons who participated personally in human rights 
violations, secondly, persons who gave orders for the violations to be committed, thirdly 
persons who created a climate in which these violations could be committed and lastly 
persons who failed to act against or punish those responsible for violations.193 As 
previously said, in majority of cases applicants had to appear before the Amnesty 
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Committee in a public hearing.194 However, the Committee could direct some hearings to 
be held in camera, except that any victim who had an interest in such proceedings had the 
right to be present at such in camera hearings. 195  
 
The procedure at the amnesty hearing was similar to that of criminal trials.196 However, it 
did permit the use of hearsay evidence, called witnesses to testify and victims had a right 
to testify and cross- examine the applicant themselves or through their legal 
representatives.197 Cases that involved gross human rights violations were held in public 
hearings, while other cases that did not involve gross human rights violations weredealt 
with administratively.198  
The decision of the Amnesty Committee was final (subject only to possible appeal to the 
Courts) and it could not be reviewed by the Commission.199 In addition to this, the PNUR 
prescribed that no criminal or civil suits against those persons who were granted amnesty 
was possible.200 
 
The amnesty process as a whole was pretty much separated from the rest of the TRC 
process – the process was legal, the committee was composed of lawyers, it was in a way 
protected from any kind of political pressures that the rest of the Commission bodies 
were subjected to.201 In the beginning, the Committee was even given powers to formally 
grant amnesties until the legislation was amended later providing that amnesties had to be 
released by the full SATRC.202  
 
The Amnesty Committee continued in operation longer than the SATRC. It held its last 
hearing and finalized all decisions at the end of 2001, while it published its report in 
2003.203 7116 persons applied for, while only 1167 were granted an amnesty and 145 got 
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partial amnesty.204 Those who received an amnesty had met the criteria of the 
Commission in terms of its mandate from the PNUR Act. However, not all of them were 
involved in committing gross violations of human rights,205 but in lesser political 
offences206. 
 
 
5.2. Amnesty process at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa – 
Criteria 
 
In terms of the PNUR Act the Amnesty Committee had the power to offer a conditional 
amnesty to applicants who satisfied its criteria, i.e. “to persons who make full disclosure 
of all relevant facts”207, in relation to “an act associated with a political objective 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past”208. These two criteria, that of ful 
disclosure and of a political objective, were perceived as the two essential factors in the 
process of establishing truth about crimes committed during apartheid era in South 
Africa.209 In its Report, the Commission stressed the importance of the full disclosure 
criterion for establishing truth: 
 
“The legislation also required that, in order for amnesty to be granted, there 
should be full disclosure of the violations in respect of which it was sought. (…) 
This was a unique feature of the South African commission. National unity and 
reconciliation could be achieved only, it was argued, if the truth about past 
violations became publicly known.”210  
 
                                                 
204 Ibid., 106-107.  
205 These were defined as involving killing, torture, abduction, severe ill treatment or any attempt of it, 
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There were other criteria, as already mentioned, but their relevance for the purposes of 
this thesis are not as important as the criteria of full disclosure and political objectives as 
the conditions for granting amnesty. However, there were also certain obvious problems 
in the amnesty process. Firstly, applicants were required to submit a written application 
on the prescribed amnesty application form.211 According to the Amnesty Committee, the 
problem was that many applications were not submitted on a proper amnesty application 
form, or that many were unsigned and/or had not been attested to by a commissioner of 
oaths.212 One of the biggest problem was that many application forms had been 
completed without legal assistance to the applicant or had been completed by others on 
behalf of illiterate persons.213 However, Jeremy Sarkin points out as one of the most 
important problems that application forms had not been designed in the best possible 
manner – the application form did not ask precise questions in order to get sufficient 
information in order to decide on application on this level. According to Sarkin, this 
creayed serious problems – especially regarding the fact that the majority of the 
applications were resolved administratively and without public hearings, as well as by an 
inadequate administrative system due to the scarce human resources available to the five 
members of the Committee.214 However, since the amnesty applications that involved 
gross human rights violations were decided in public hearings, we can conclude that the 
problem of imprecise forms did not have a crucial influence on obtaining full disclosure 
in these most serious cases.     
 
What could have presented a more serious problem in applying the criterion of full 
disclosure was that there was no clear guidance as to what ‘full disclosure’ actually 
meant, since there were no specified provisions to this effect in the PNUR Act. However, 
according to Ronald Slye, this may not have been such a problem. Slye argues that lack 
of precise guidelines could actually have been positive, since it created some uncertainty 
for applicants, who could not have known precisely what information would be 
significant or not, and which information were already in possession of the 
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Commission.215 Slye argues that “the effect of this requirement was that individual 
applicants had an incentive to disclose as much damaging material about themselves and 
their colleagues as they believed the commission’s investigative team had been able to 
uncover”.216 
 
The SATRC offered this interpretation of its application of the full disclosure criterion:  
“It is important to stress, however, that the obligation to make full disclosure 
related only to relevant facts. This required that the Committee develop an 
interpretation of the phrase ‘relevant facts’. (…) The facts to be disclosed were, 
therefore, only those relevant to the incident in question. The interpretation 
adopted by the Committee required that applicants give a full and truthful account 
of their own role, as well as that of any other person, in the planning and 
execution of the actions in question. Furthermore, applicants had to give full 
details of any other relevant conduct or steps taken subsequent to the commission 
of the particular acts: for example, concealing or destroying evidence of the 
offence.”217 
 
The Commission also discussed the criticism that its interpretation of the full disclosure 
criterion was problematic ‘because it is perceived as having inhibited the potential of the 
amnesty process to contribute to the overall objective of the truth and reconciliation 
process, namely of establishing as complete a picture as possible of the political conflicts 
of the past’.218 Critics claimed that the Commission’s interpretation and application of the 
full disclosure criterion did not serve the overall objective of the process in that 
applicants ‘were able to hold back information about incidents that were unlikely to be 
uncovered in the future, an attitude that frustrated the very intention of the overall 
process’219. 
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As justification for its interpretation of the full disclosure criterion, the Commission 
noted that there were other measures that Commission had used to compile information 
in order to establish a full picture about past abuses:  
“It should also be pointed out that the Act gave the Commission certain general 
powers of investigation and subpoena, which allowed it to look further into any 
matters left unresolved by the amnesty process. The Committee accepts, however, 
that the criticism relating to possible shortcomings in the process as enacted is 
serious and substantial.”220  
 
The second important criterion, that of having a political objective was closely associated 
with that of full disclosure - in order to be granted amnesty the applicant had to prove that 
the act he applied for is associated with a political objective.221 The political association 
had to be indicated on the amnesty application form, and the Amnesty committee could 
grant amnesty without public hearing if the applicant gave full disclosure and proved that 
the act was associated with a political objective, but did not constitute a gross violation of 
human rights. However, when it came to applicants who went through amnesty hearings, 
the decision whether an act was related to a political objective was decided by the 
Amnesty Committee.222  
 
There are certain issues that were of particular interest in deciding whether the applicants 
fulfilled this requirement. Firstly, the Amnesty Committee had to decide whether the 
applicant fulfill the criterion of membership of a political organisation, i.e. which 
political group the applicant was a member of. As defined in the PNUR, amnesty was 
granted to “any member or supporter of a publicly known political organisation or 
liberation movement on behalf of or in support of such organisation or movement 
(...)”223; “any employee of the State or any former state or any member of the security 
forces of the State or any former state in the course and scope of his or her duties and 
within the scope of his or her express or implied authority directed against a publicly 
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known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in a political struggle 
against the State or a former state or against any members or supporters of such 
organisation or movement (...)”224; “any employee or member of a publicly known 
political organisation or liberation movement in the course and scope of his or her duties 
and within the scope of his or her express or implied authority directed against the State 
or any former state or any publicly known political organisation or liberation movement 
(...)”225; any person in the performance of a coup d' etat to take over the government of 
any former state, or in any attempt thereto (...)”226; and any person that associated himself 
or herself with the acts or crimes that were committed227, as defined by the Act as well as 
those who were members of these groups, who on reasonable grounds believed that he or 
she was acting in the course and scope of his or her duties and within the scope of his or 
her express or implied authority228. 229.                                
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                    
The overlap between certain sections, allowed the Amnesty Committee to interpret this 
section in various ways.  
 
Sarkin analyzed the application of this set of criteria and pointed out that the Amnesty 
Committee interpreted it relatively widely. In the case of applications by persons 
applying in the case of Amy Biehl, membership in the party or liberation movement was 
not crucial, but their support for the party. The Amnesty Committee concluded that 
although applicants in this case did not act under orders or instructions of the Azanian 
People’s Liberation Army or Pan Africanist Congress, and were not members of APLA, 
they were active supporters of the PAC, and acted in order to support the liberation 
struggle against the State.230 
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Another important conclusion made by authors analyzing the amnesty process and 
application of political objective criteria was that the Amnesty Committee focused on the 
question whether the act or offense was done under the order or on behalf of the state or 
political organization.231 Slye particularly discussed this issue: “in practice the committee 
has mostly looked to whether an authorised superior in a recognised political organisation 
ordered the act, or whether the act was closely related to an explicit programmatic 
statement of an established political organisation”.232 He goes further and argues that in 
the cases where political organization approved a particular act, it was more likely for the 
applicant to be granted amnesty, but that in the different situation, where a political 
organization denied approval of certain acts, amnesty could be denied to them. Slye 
rightly pointed out that this situation allowed for the possibility that political parties 
‘might have confirmed or denied the official nature of an applicant’s activities based on 
their then current political interests’233. 
 
However, our account of the procedure and criteria of the Amnesty process still needs to 
address the central question for the purpose of this thesis, i.e. the contributions made by 
the application of the ‘full disclosure’ and ‘political objective’ criteria to the 
establishment of truth about human rights abuses in the conflict of the past. To what 
extent, and in what ways, did the TRC amnesty process amount to a truth process?  This 
shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Transitional justice and truth-telling in post-conflict societies  
 
6.1. Conditional amnesty and truth-telling at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa  
 
The process of establishment of truth about past human rights abuses at the SATRC 
involved two parallel inquiries – one conducted by the Human Rights Violations 
Committee, in public hearings where victims told stories about their suffering and the 
human rights violations they had endured, and one conducted by the Amnesty 
Committee, where perpetrators testified about the human rights violations they had 
committed and for which they required amnesty.  
 
As noted by Boraine, “the provision of amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights has 
been and remains a source of heated debate and controversy in the international human 
rights community”234. The SATRC provisions for granting amnesty were heavily 
criticized by the international human rights community, as well as by victims and 
representatives of victims’ association. The political party Azapo and the families of 
victims even took the SATRC to the court and challenged the PNUR Act’s provision for 
granting amnesty before the Constitutional Court of South Africa.235 Their main 
argument was that the PNUR Act was not in accordance with the new Constitution of 
South Africa. In its judgment, delivered in July 1996, the Court found that amnesty was 
crucial for establishing truth about past crimes and, therefore, essential for reconciliation:  
 
“That truth, which the victims of repression seek so desperately to know is, in the 
circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for such 
monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to disclose the whole truth with the incentive 
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that they will not receive the punishment which they undoubtedly deserve if they 
do. Without that incentive there is nothing to encourage such persons to make the 
disclosures and to reveal the truth which persons in the positions of the applicants 
so desperately desire..”236 
 
The conclusion of the Constitutional Court of South Africa was welcomed by some 
scholars had argued that this form of amnesty represents the most sophisticated of all 
models of amnesties that had been seen until then,237 and - as one of the most prominent 
scholars in the area of amnesty Ronald Slye argued - the only one that could “come close 
to qualify as an accountable amnesty”238. Slye identified several conditions for an 
amnesty to be qualified as accountable. Firstly, the decision to establish an amnesty 
process has to be brought about in a democratic way meaning they cannot take the form 
of self-amnesty or be brought about by those who are going to be the beneficiaries of its 
provisions. An accountable amnesty needs to be mandated by a democratic government 
through a wide public debate.239 Secondly, amnesty cannot be granted to those who are 
responsible for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.240 
Thirdly, this kind of amnesty demands that an applicant should be subjected to a public 
hearing where he would be “open to an examination” and publicly acknowledge the 
deeds he or she was responsible for.241 Fourthly, victims have to have the possibility to 
question the requests for an amnesty by applicants.242 Fifthly, this model of amnesty has 
to provide a form of reparations for victims.243 And lastly, it has to be a part of a wider 
transitional process, as a facilitator for the establishment of the rule of law and a broader 
reconciliation process in the country.244 As Slye pointed out, thus far only the South 
African amnesty process can be seen to fulfill these conditions. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the process of amnesty at the SATRC was one of accountable amnesty.   
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The most important feature allowing the South African amnesty to be described as 
accountable is that “amnesty was exchanged for truth”.245  The bargain was that 
applicants should make a full disclosure regarding the abuses they committed or 
participated in. If they attempted to give only partial information, the Committee was 
empowered to deny them amnesty, implying that they remained liable to be prosecuted 
afterwards. The requirement that perpetrators give a full disclosure was very important 
for the South African transition – the amnesty applicants provided “very wide and 
detailed information not only to the Amnesty Committee but to the whole South Africa, 
because of the public nature of the hearings. The silence was broken and at least a 
measure of truth was revealed.”246  The TRC argued this issue in its Report: 
“The amnesty process had a critical role to play in helping establish the fullest 
possible picture of the past political conflict in the country. To this end, amnesty 
applicants were legally required to give a full and truthful account of the incidents 
in respect of which they were seeking amnesty. They were accordingly required 
to make full disclosure of all of the facts relevant to the incident in question.”247 
 
When an applicant was found to be untruthful, the application was refused. However, in 
relation to what a full disclosure required, the TRC observed: 
“The obligation to make full disclosure related only to relevant facts. (…) The 
Committee concluded that the obligation in question related solely to the 
particular incident forming the subject matter of the application and did not 
extend to any incidents not raised in the amnesty application. The facts to be 
disclosed were, therefore, only those relevant to the incident in question. The 
interpretation adopted by the Committee required that applicants give a full and 
truthful account of their own role, as well as that of any other person, in the 
planning and execution of the actions in question. Furthermore, applicants had to 
give full details of any other relevant conduct or steps taken subsequent to the 
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commission of the particular acts: for example, concealing or destroying evidence 
of the offence.”248  
 
The truth spoken and revealed by perpetrators was thus seen as no less important than the 
truth spoken by the thousands of victims that testified at victims’ hearings. While 
victims’ testimonies were seen as an opportunity for victims to “unburden their grief 
publicly”249 and to explain publicly in their own language what had happened to them, 
the testimonies of perpetrators provided victims with knowledge to know “what did in 
truth happen to their loved ones, where and under which circumstances it did happen, and 
who was responsible.”250 As Boraine argued, the truth revealed through testimonies of 
victims and perpetrators “challenged the myths, the lies, and the half-truths conveyed and 
distributed at every level by the former regime”251.  
 
The truth-telling process in the South African TRC thus countered the prevailing official 
and public denials of the political crimes committed during violent conflict in South 
Africa. As in similar cases in Chile and Argentina, where the work of the truth 
commission prevented claims that the military had not killed or tortured political 
opponents of the regimes in these countries,252 it became impossible to deny that the 
atrocities of the apartheid regime and the abuses by liberation movements did not happen.    
As Boraine argued in the case of the SATRC “the Commission therefore unapologetically 
set out to try to reach a public and official acknowledgment of what happened during the 
apartheid era. If only to counter the distorted and partial recording of history in South 
Africa, it was necessary that there should be an accurate record of the period under 
review.”253 Besides breaking the prevailing official denial of past atrocities the TRC 
achieved a significant measure of  acknowledgment and accountability for  past 
atrocities, thereby countering the impunity within South Africa In the words of Boraine: 
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“the truth which the Commission was required to establish had to contribute to the 
reparation of the damage inflicted in the past and to the prevention of it ever happening 
again in the future.”254 This aspect of searching for the truth through victims’ accounts as 
well as through perpetrators’ accounts was presumed to have a healing component in the 
process of dealing with the past. Boraine argued that “for a healing to be a possibility, 
knowledge in itself is not enough. Knowledge must be accompanied by acknowledgment, 
an acceptance of accountability. To acknowledge publicly that thousands of South 
Africans have paid a very high price for the attainment of democracy affirms the human 
dignity of the victims and survivors and is an integral part of the South African 
society”.255  
The importance of full disclosure as a condition for granting amnesty to the process of 
establishment of truth was recognized from the outset of the SATRC process. The 
founding document of the SATRC, the PNUR Act, clearly accentuated how necessary it 
was for South Africa ‘to establish the truth in relation to past events as well as the 
motives for and circumstances in which gross violations of human fights have occurred, 
and to make the findings known in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in future’.256 
Furthermore, the PNUR Act reiterated call in the Postamble of the Interim Constitution of 
South Africa:  
“that the pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and 
peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the 
reconstruction of society; (...) that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not 
for victimization; (...) that in order to advance such reconciliation and 
reconstruction amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences 
associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the 
past”.257                                                           
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This importance was also recognized by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which 
emphasized the necessity of amnesty provisions in the PNUR Act, when deciding in the 
case of the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO), Nontsikelelo Ntsiki Biko, 
Churchill Mhleli Mxenge, and Chris Ribeiro who had legally challenged the amnesty 
provisions in the Act in July 1996:  
“The Act seeks to address this massive problem by encouraging these survivors 
and the dependants of the tortured and the wounded, the maimed and the dead to 
unburden their grief publicly, to receive the collective recognition of a new nation 
that they were wronged, and crucially, to help them to discover what did in truth 
happen to their loved ones, where and under what circumstances it did happen, 
and who was responsible.”258   
 
The judges of the Constitutional court went even further – they had understood that the 
granting of amnesty is crucial for achieving the goals of the TRC: 
“The amnesties made available to individuals are indispensable if an essential 
object of the legislation is to be achieved, the object of eliciting the truth at last 
about atrocities committed in the past and the responsibility borne for them. The 
primary sources of information concerning those infamies, the perpetrators 
themselves, would hardly be willing to divulge it voluntarily, honestly and 
candidly without the protection of exemptions from personal liability, civil no less 
than criminal.  The emergence of the truth, or a good deal of that at any rate, 
depends after all on no fear of the consequences continuing to daunt them from 
telling it, on their encouragement by the prospect of amnesties to reveal it instead. 
The shroud of silence that has enveloped their activities for too long would 
otherwise go on doing so.”259   
Thus, it can be argued that the truth process was understood not only as a process based 
on the accounts of victims, but also of those who participated in committing gross human 
rights violations, since they were the only one that could provide enough insight into the 
motivation of these violations in South Africa.  
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For the purposes of this thesis it can be valuable to examine the amnesty process in South 
Africa within the normative frame of a human right to truth. As previously said, 
according to the definition of the right to truth in the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights study report from 2006, the right to truth encompasses: 
“knowing the full and complete truth as to the events that transpired, their specific 
circumstances, and who participated in them, including knowing the circumstances in 
which the violations took place, as well as the reasons for them.”.260 
It can thus be argued that the amnesty process of the SATRC, as designed in order to 
obtain information about human rights violations from perpetrators, was in accordance 
with what international jurisprudence defined as the right to truth. Secondly, it can be 
argued that the process of granting amnesty and making compromises with perpetrators 
contributed to the process of establishment of the truth about crimes committed during 
the period of examination of the SATRC. 
 
Firstly, it is important to look at the underlying purposes of the requirements of the 
amnesty procedure as designed by the founding act of the SATRC - the PNUR Act of 
1995. As we saw in the previous chapter the Amnesty Committee had to develop the 
detailed more procedure and criteria for granting amnesty, but the most important of 
these were that the applicant for amnesty had to make  “a full disclosure of all relevant 
facts”,261 along with the second main requirement that “the act, omission or offence to 
which the application relates is an act associated with a political objective committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past”262.  
 
The purpose of the first requirement of the Act for the Amnesty Committee was to obtain 
as much as relevant facts about past crimes as an amnesty applicant could provide to the 
Commission. As Slye noted, the absence of precise instructions within the PNUR Act of 
1995 or from the Amnesty Committee on what the “full disclosure” actually was 
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supposed to be, could have been problematic for effective and comprehensive truth-
telling. A potential consequence could have been that the absence of precise instructions 
as to how amnesty applicants should meet the requirement of “full disclosure” might 
have prevented the Commission from eliciting as much as information as there were 
about human rights violations in South Africa. The question can be raised how the 
Amnesty Committee could know whether an amnesty applicant’s disclosure was full and 
comprehensive, if it did not receive all the information about the events he or she applied 
for? But, as we have seen, Slye argues that the lack of clear guidance on this requirement 
along with its comprehensiveness were actually crucial to its effectiveness – applicants 
required to give certain specified information may well omit other important information 
they might volunteer, along with extraneous or irrelevant information, in response to a 
more open-ended requirement for “full disclosure”. It was up to the Amnesty Committee 
to decide on the pertinence of amnesty applicants’ “full disclosures” – the Amnesty 
Committee was mandated to evaluate what was relevant and important in the disclosures 
elicited and not just check their conformity to a pre-determined set of specified 
requirements. The applicants could not know the amount of information already gathered 
from other sources, such as victims and witnesses of crimes, by the Committee about a 
particular crime. The Amnesty Committee was the instance that was tasked to compare 
the information provided by single amnesty applicant to all the information gathered from 
victims, witnesses, as well as from other amnesty applicants, and then decide on the 
quality of information received.263 The additional value of the procedure was that the Act 
prescribed that any person implicated in the process, or interested in it, is to be notified of 
the time and the place of the amnesty hearing for that case, informed about their right to 
attend the hearing, but also “to testify, adduce evidence and submit any article to be taken 
into consideration”264 Therefore, during the process, amnesty applicants had the 
possibility to face their victims at the amnesty hearing, victims who were allowed to 
listen to them, and could confirm or question their claims, and potentially prove with 
their statements that applicants were not telling the whole truth or giving full disclosure 
about the events for which they had requested amnesty. Through this provision, it can 
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thus be argued that the amnesty process in South Africa was in accordance with the 
requirements for an accountable amnesty and contributed to the establishment of truth 
and fulfilling the right to truth of victims, who have a right to know the full and complete 
truth as to the events that transpired.  
 
The second requirement of the PNUR Act of 1995, was that the acts or offences for 
which the amnesty applicants applied had to be acts “associated with a political objective 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past”.265 This requirement in effect meant 
that the Amnesty committee had a power to place the facts elicit from amnesty applicants 
and their role in any crime committed during the period of investigation by the 
Commission by them into the organisational and institutional contexts of human rights 
violations and not treat these as isolated incidents. If observed from the normative 
demands of the right to truth, such as the right to know not only who participated in 
abuses, but also knowing the circumstances in which the violations took place, as well as 
the reasons for them, including the organisational and institutional contexts, this 
provision of the PNUR Act of 1995, allow us to conclude that these amnesty provisions 
were in accordance with the demands for the fulfilment of the victims’ right to truth.  
 
Another provision of the PNUR Act of 1995 took cognizance of the right to truth, not 
only in regards to victims, but also to society as a whole. After granting amnesty to a 
particular applicant, the Commission was bound to inform the applicant and any victim 
about the decision of the Committee to grant amnesty.266 The Amnesty Committee was 
also obliged to submit to the SATRC a record of the proceedings, which could be used by 
the Commission.267 The Amnesty Committee also had to immediately make known and 
accessible to the public “the full names of any person to whom amnesty has been granted, 
together with sufficient information to identify the act, omission or offence in respect of 
which amnesty has been granted”268. With regard to these provisions, it can be argued 
that the PNUR Act of 1995 was in accordance not only with victims’ right to know the 
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truth and to know who participated in crimes, but also with the demand that a society 
“has the right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous 
crimes, as well as the circumstances and the reasons for which aberrant crimes came to be 
committed”269. 
 
Moreover, it is valuable to look at how the SATRC actually put this provision into 
practice. In its final report, the Commission recorded how the information that was given 
by amnesty applicants was analyzed by the Commission. Firstly, members of the 
Research Department and the Investigation Unit of the SATRC scrutinized all 
applications for amnesty.270 These two bodies were established by the SATRC precisely 
in order to investigate and analyse the material that Commission was gathering. The 
Investigation Unit was firstly tasked to assist in the verification of statements provided by 
victims who were selected to testify at hearings,271 and after a large number of statements 
were gathered, the Investigation Unit focused on the task of verifying and corroborating 
all these statements272. Finally and most importantly, the Investigation Unit collaborated 
with the Amnesty Committee in order to corroborate information gathered.273 The 
Research Department was established “in order to assist with the analysis and 
contextualisation of the enormous amount of data, evidence and information that it 
received. Although the department was principally concerned with primary data received 
from various sources, it also considered a range of secondary sources on issues relevant 
to the Commission’s work.”274 Basically, the Research Department analyzed each 
statement received by the Commission and categorised it according to theme275 - almost 
all of the information gathered and received by the Commission were analysed by the 
Research Department. As stated in the final report, this included: “submissions made by 
various institutions (political parties, state structures, non-governmental organizations 
and so on); evidence received at the various hearings of the Commission; evidence 
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received in amnesty applications and hearings; archival material; transcriptions of section 
29 enquiries; interviews conducted by experts or relevant persons, and secondary 
material.”276  
 
According to the final report of the SATRC, information obtained from the amnesty 
process were contained either in the written applications submitted by amnesty 
applicants, or obtained from the testimony given at the amnesty hearings by amnesty 
applicants.277 All of this information was then examined by the Investigative Unit and the 
Research Department, and classified, based on the amnesty applicant’s identity, into three 
groups: those that worked as agents of the previous state system or in support of the 
status quo; those that worked to overthrow the state; and the white right wing.278 Each 
sub-category of amnesty applicants was then analysed in order to identify key themes 
common to each group, which allowed the Commission to examine all applications and 
place them in relation to particular themes.279 Ideally this strict and interconnected 
procedure of bodies within the TRC in relation to information gathered from victims, 
witnesses and amnesty applicants allowed the evidence collected from sources such as 
victim statements and from hearings was meant to be integrated with the information 
contained in amnesty applications.280 As argued in the final report, “the result of this 
process of gathering information from a range of sources and representing a range of 
perspectives was a more nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the nature, causes and 
extent of gross violations of human rights”281. 
 
Still, if one of the major goals of the SATRC’s amnesty process was to establish truth 
about past violations, in effect to ‘exchange amnesty for truth’ the question remains to 
what extent this process actually contributed to the establishment of truth in practice. It is 
particularly important to look at the actual contribution of the two major criteria for 
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obtaining amnesty – full disclosure and political objective -- to the process of 
establishment of truth.  
 
Some commentators have claimed that the TRC amnesty process did not actually 
contribute that much to the uncovering of new truth about past abuses committed during 
apartheid and exposed little of what was previously unknown.282 However, as argued by 
Sarkin, in key cases the full disclosure criterion did succeed in encouraging amnesty 
applicants ‘to reveal all relevant information about what had occurred and their role in the 
offences for which, they sought amnesty’283. As we have seen Slye also argued that the 
vague explanations of what the criterion of “full disclosure” actually meant and how it 
was applied by the Amnesty committee, actually did contribute significantly to the 
process of establishment of truth.  
 
The second important criterion, that of having a political objective, applied by the 
Amnesty committee in the process of granting amnesty can be seen as even more 
important in contributing to the process of establishing truth by the SATRC. As Slye 
argued: 
 “The effect of the amnesty interpretation of ‘political’ is to place a fair amount of 
power with the state, political parties and other political organisations in decisions 
concerning amnesty. Whether an individual is granted amnesty or not may depend 
on whether the state or a political organisation admits to having ordered the action 
in question, or whether the action is considered consistent with the political and 
programmatic goals of the organisation as expressed by its governing bodies (if 
any) or leaders”.284 
It can thus be argued that the application of this criterion has significantly contributed to 
establishment of truth. Firstly, although applicants were individuals who told the truth 
about what they personally did, having to meet this requirement meant establishing links 
between command structure, exposed orders that were given to individuals, and finally 
the nature of system that stood behind violence in South Africa. However, Slye concedes 
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that from a human rights perspective this principle also has negative implications in so far 
as it diminished the individual accountability of the amnesty applicants who committed 
crimes. Slye argued that “the removal of ‘following orders’ as an absolute defence 
established moral and legal responsibility of each individual for his acts, and asserts that 
individuals, including military personnel, are moral beings who not only can, but also 
must, discern right from wrong and act accordingly”285. However, if we establish truth 
only about acts of crimes committed by individuals, important parts  of the truth about the 
nature of violent crimes can easily be lost – the truth about the system that stood behind 
the commission of crimes, the command structure of forces involved in conflict that 
mobilized individuals who acted upon orders or were inspired by ideology.  
 
To summarise, it can be concluded that this type of procedure for compromises with 
perpetrators, the methodology for corroborating information from different types of 
sources, such as victims, witnesses and amnesty applicants, as designed for the amnesty 
process of the TRC contributed significantly to the process of establishing the truth about 
the crimes that were committed.  
 
Secondly, it can be concluded that the provision of public hearings for amnesty 
applicants, and publishing the Amnesty Committee decisions was valuable for a society 
in South Africa. Boraine observed that since amnesty hearings were open to the general 
public, it meant it was available to the society as a whole, but also to all those interested 
parties that needed information obtained at these hearings.286 Some scholars argue that 
the impact of several amnesty hearings was tremendous – there was no return back to old 
versions of these events, or old denials – “public hearings created common knowledge 
about certain cases. In this way, terms such as ‘torture’ or ‘state killings’ became part of 
the language of a wider range of citizens instead of only those who had experienced these 
violations.287  
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6.2. Plea bargaining process and establishment of truth at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia  
 
What is the contribution, if any of the plea bargaining process, introduced by the ICTY, 
to the establishment of truth about past political crimes? How did the practice of making 
plea agreements with persons indicted for the most serious violations of human rights by 
the ICTY contribute to the establishment of truth? This will be examined with reference 
to the mandated goals and objectives of the ICTY in relation to the plea bargaining 
process actually introduced by judges and prosecutors of the ICTY. In order to 
understand the contribution of the plea bargaining process to the establishment of truth, it 
will also be important to look at the procedures defined by the ICTY Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. 
As already said, initially the practice of plea bargaining was firmly rejected by the 
majority of the Tribunal officials and more especially by the Tribunal’s first President as 
being clearly incompatible with the goals of the ICTY. In the words of the founding 
resolution of the UN Security Council the ICTY was established for “the sole purpose of 
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991” in order to 
“put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons 
who are responsible for them”, and finally to “contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace”.288  
However, in time the judges of the Tribunal expanded their understanding of the 
purpose of the Tribunal, shifting from that of a mere retributive mechanism towards an 
institution that will promote reconciliation through trials. In the sentencing judgement 
against one of the defendants, The ICTY judges concluded that: “It was anticipated that 
through criminal proceedings, the Tribunal would contribute to peace and reconciliation 
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in the former Yugoslavia, and beyond, through the establishment of the truth and the 
promotion of the rule of law.”289 
In effect, the practice of plea-bargaining was introduced at both the ICTY and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) after serious pressure from the 
international community to expedite their work, as well as increasing efforts to obtain 
evidence from high-level officials. This second was particularly important for the ICTY. 
The ICTY was experiencing strong pressure due to the increased number of complicated 
cases to prosecute. Notably the ICTY succeeded in having the most prominent indictee – 
the former president of Yugoslavia and Serbia, Slobodan Milošević -- indicted for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, and 
Kosovo between 1998 and 1999, and genocide committed in war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. Milošević’s case was the most important challenge 
for the ICTY and for international justice – he was the first head of state ever to face trial 
for such crimes.  
Along with the increased number of cases, the complexity of these high profile cases 
presented additional problems to the ICTY prosecutors. These cases involved tens of 
thousands of dead civilians and soldiers, as well as forcible displacement of millions of 
people in the former Yugoslavia. Taken together the prosecution of political leaders 
whose crimes touched on large geographic areas over lengthy time periods and with 
countless victims presented a serious challenge to the ICTY.290 Investigators of the ICTY 
were faced with difficulties in investigating the complex links and connections between 
perpetrators, the formal and informal chains of command between official armed forces 
and paramilitary units, while also facing a serious lack of documentary evidences.  As 
Tieger and Shin argued, it was not easy to secure the necessary access to witnesses, due 
to the intimidation and fear among potential witnesses who might cooperate with the 
ICTY, as well as because of domestic political hostility in countries of the region towards 
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the ICTY.291 This was especially significant for securing ‘insider witnesses’, persons who 
had been part of the armed forces or members of the paramilitary groups and could 
provide information and evidences that would link high-level officials with crimes 
committed on the ground.  
Alan Tieger and Milbert Shin, both Trial Attorneys at the Office of the Prosecutor at the 
ICTY, recounted the experiences of the investigators while working on these complex 
cases: 
“Even when the OTP has been successful in compelling document production, the 
perpetrators of crimes on a vast scale do not always obligingly leave a clear paper 
trail. Access to witnesses has been similarly limited, for reasons including a 
continuing climate of intimidation and fear, domestic political hostility to 
cooperation with the Tribunal, and even bureaucratic obstacles.”292 
In the circumstances it is not surprising that the main rationales used at the beginning 
in order to justify the introduction of plea bargaining process at the ICTY were precisely 
those of saving the resources and time of the ICTY given the complexity of the cases. In 
the Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah in the Appeals 
Chamber judgment in the 1996 case of Dražen Erdemović, the first defendant that 
pleaded guilty at the ICTY, the  Appeals Chamber judges argued that:  
“This common law institution of the guilty plea should, in our view, find a 
ready place in an international criminal forum such as the International Tribunal 
confronted by cases which, by their inherent nature, are very complex and 
necessarily require lengthy hearings if they go to trial under stringent financial 
constraints arising from allocations made by the United Nations itself dependent 
upon the contributions of States.”293 
However, after a wave of guilty pleas in 2003, when 9 out of 10 defendants pleaded 
guilty with some of these involving plea agreements that caused an outcry among victims 
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in Bosnia due to the charge bargaining294, the judges of the ICTY began to shift from the 
importance of resource savings, and even began to openly criticize its value as the most 
important rationale for making plea agreements with defendants. Instead, as Combs 
noticed, the ICTY introduced the ‘language of restorative justice’ in explaining the 
reasoning behind using the practice of plea bargaining:295 
“The Trial Chamber notes that the savings of time and resources due to a guilty 
plea has often been considered as a valuable and justifiable reason for the 
promotion of guilty pleas. This Trial Chamber cannot fully endorse this argument. 
(…) The quality of the justice and the fulfilment of the mandate of the Tribunal, 
including the establishment of a complete and accurate record of the crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia, must not be compromised.”296  
Significantly, the contribution of plea agreements to the process of establishment of 
truth was recognized in more and more cases. In the sentencing judgment in the case of 
Biljana Plavšić, judges of the ICTY emphasized that acknowledgment of guilt in 
important for the process of establishing the truth:      
“The Trial Chamber accepts that acknowledgement and full disclosure of 
serious crimes are very important when establishing the truth in relation to such 
crimes. This, together with acceptance of responsibility for the committed 
wrongs, will promote reconciliation.”297   
Having noted this shift in the ICTY’s understanding of the contribution of the plea 
bargaining process to the establishment of truth as part of transitional justice and 
reconciliation, we need  to analyze more clearly the nature of that contribution. This can 
be done by looking at some key features of the procedure of plea bargaining with 
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particular reference to establishing truth about crimes in line with the normative frame of 
the right to truth.  
 
As previously mentioned, the right to truth encompass ‘knowing the full and complete 
truth as to the events that transpired, their specific circumstances, and who participated in 
them, including knowing the circumstances in which the violations took place, as well as 
the reasons for them. In cases of enforced disappearance, missing persons, children 
abducted or during the captivity of a mother subjected to enforced disappearance, secret 
executions and secret burial place, the right to the truth also has a special dimension:  to 
know the fate and whereabouts of the victim’.298 Additionally, a post-conflict society as a 
whole also ‘has the right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration 
of heinous crimes, as well as the circumstances and the reasons for which aberrant crimes 
came to be committed, so that such events do not reoccur in the future’.299 
 
On closer analysis it appears that the provisions for plea bargaining at the ICTY are 
designed for defendants who pleaded guilty to contribute to various forms of 
establishment of truth. In the course of plea-bargaining agreements defendants can 
provide significant facts about the crimes that were committed - they can give valuable 
information about such crimes, the whereabouts of victims’ remains, who ordered the 
crimes, who participated in their commitment, they can draw the chain of command and -
- most significantly - they can implicate the ‘big fish’ with crimes on the ground. 
Defendants were obliged to provide statements of facts, in which they had to provide 
detailed information about crimes for which they pleaded guilty. Tieger and Shin, both 
Trial Attorneys at the ICTY, claim that “Chambers have increasingly required the 
submission of statements and documents that support both the acknowledgement of guilt 
by the accused and the indictment to which he pleaded guilty. In smaller cases, these 
submissions may reflect virtually the sum total of witness information on which the 
prosecution intended to rely. Even in cases dealing with several offences and multiple 
counts, the prosecution's submission of supportive material is likely to focus on the heart 
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of its case.”300 This practice presents a potentially very important contribution to the 
fulfillment of the right to truth, since in many cases it allowed prosecutors not only to 
obtain information about crimes, but also to reveal the different phases of preparation of 
the crimes, commitment of crimes and the role of defendants in those crimes.301  
 
Let us consider the provisions of plea bargaining procedure as defined by the ICTY Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. Firstly, we need to understand what the power of the 
prosecutor to amend the indictment after agreeing on plea bargaining with the defendant 
actually means. We shall not go into analysing each and every case of plea agreements 
where this was implemented, but look at the potential contribution of this provision to the 
process of establishment of truth.  
 
The power given to ICTY prosecutors to amend the charges of the indictment when a 
defendant agrees to admit guilt for certain crimes actually allowed the prosecutor of the 
ICTY to decide not to include certain charges or to dismiss charges that were already 
included in the indictment, in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea.302 Deciding to 
dismiss charges that were part of the indictment can be done for different reasons – lack 
of sufficient evidences to prove these crimes beyond reasonable doubt, lack of securing 
witnesses and a weak possibility to link indicted persons with crimes on the ground, 
which can often be the case with indictments against highly positioned political officials. 
However, in this particular case, when this process is understood also as a truth-telling 
process, this can also have adverse consequences. Firstly, it may distort the extent of facts 
that otherwise could have been established. That is due to the provision that ICTY 
defendants are taken to admit guilt and disclose facts only for those counts of the 
indictment that remain in the indictment, while other counts are dismissed, which may be 
taken to imply that these crimes never happened, and thus that the facts about these 
crimes were false. Secondly, as Sharf analyzed the plea agreement by Biljana Plavšić, it 
can be argued that by dismissing charges from the indictment, it can be perceived by the 
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public and victims that the prosecutor and the ICTY judges, actually admit that these 
crimes never took place.303  
 
Similar concerns regarding the implications of charge bargaining were also expressed by 
judges of the ICTY, who particularly accentuated their concerns with the implications 
this might have for the process of establishment of truth: 
“Most concerning to this Trial Chamber is that as a result of the negotiations 
entered into by the Prosecutor and defence, the final plea agreement may include 
provisions such that the Prosecutor withdraws certain charges or certain factual 
allegations. The Prosecutor may do so for a variety of reasons. In cases where 
factual allegations are withdrawn, the public record established by that case might 
be incomplete or at least open to question, as the public will not know whether the 
allegations were withdrawn because of insufficient evidence or because they were 
simply a “bargaining chip” in the negotiation process. (...) In cases where charges 
are withdrawn, extreme caution must be urged.  The Prosecutor has a duty to 
prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law. The crimes falling 
within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal are fundamentally different from crimes 
prosecuted nationally. Although it may seem appropriate to “negotiate” a charge 
of attempted murder to a charge of aggravated assault, any “negotiations” on a 
charge of genocide or crimes against humanity must be carefully considered and 
be entered into for good cause. (…) Once a charge of genocide has been 
confirmed, it should not simply be bargained away. (…) The public may be left to 
wonder about the motives for guilty pleas, whether the conviction in fact reflects 
the full criminal conduct of the accused and whether it establishes a credible and 
complete historical record.”304 
However, following these serious criticisms in the case of some plea agreements 
based on charge bargaining, the ICTY rules for plea bargaining introduced by the Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, was amended to allow a plea agreement with the 
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defendant only if he or she provides additional information relevant to the accountability 
of other defendants. Nancy Combs, who investigated all the cases of plea bargaining at 
the ICTY, presented a valuable analysis of cases where this demand was made by the 
prosecution. As she shows, in many cases of plea bargaining, defendants were obliged to 
provide information to the prosecution on other defendants and testify against them, 
when necessary, if they were asked to do that by the prosecution.305 In some cases, and in 
order to be assured that the defendants will comply with this requirement, the sentencing 
judgment was postponed until defendants testified in cases in which they were considered 
as having important information to provide.306  
The plea agreement made between ICTY prosecutor and Momir Nikolić presents a 
valuable example of how this was understood:   
“This Agreement is contingent upon Momir Nikolić’s voluntary decision to 
accept responsibility for his actions and to co-operate with and to provide truthful 
and complete information to the Office of the Prosecutor whenever requested. In 
accordance with such co-operation, Momir Nikolić agrees to meet as often as 
necessary with members of the Office of the Prosecutor in order to provide them 
with full and complete information and evidence that is known to him regarding 
the events surrounding the attack and fall of the Srebrenica enclave July 1995. 
Mr. Nikolić agrees to be truthful and candid, and to freely answer all questions 
put to him by members of the Office of the Prosecutor. Mr. Nikolić agrees to 
testify truthfully in the trial of the co-Accused in this case before the Tribunal and 
in any other trials, hearings or other proceedings before the Tribunal as requested 
by the Prosecution.”307  
In these cases, the prosecution was willing to make recommendations about sentences 
only after they had evaluated their testimonies as truthful and forthright.  
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It can be argued that the condition of testifying against other defendants for those who 
pleaded guilty potentially presents a very significant contribution to the process of 
establishment of truth, since this procedure allowed for additional and important 
information to be obtained in such cases, and as Combs argues, were invaluable to 
prosecutors.308  
 
Another important feature of the plea bargaining procedure that has to be evaluated in 
terms of its contribution to the establishment of truth is the encouragement of defendants 
who pleaded guilty to express their remorse and to make official statements of remorse 
during trial hearings. It can be argued that these statements are not honest and truthful, 
since they were expressed at sentence hearings. For many, especially victims, these were 
perceived as nothing but attempts of defendants ‘to save their skin’ in order to receive 
more lenient sentences.309 However, these statements may also present an important 
contribution to the process of establishment of truth. In case of highly positioned political 
leaders, these statements presented not only an expression of remorse, but also provided 
valuable insights into the patterns of abuses committed during wars, which is essential for 
the proper understanding of  the motives for crimes. In addition, this type of statements 
present a form of apology to victims, given by those who were responsible for 
committing crimes, and who are willing to admit that guilt.   
 
The powerful statement of remorse by Biljana Plavšić, co-President of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership during war in Bosnia, was perceived as an unprecedented in the process of 
establishment of truth. She was the first political leader of Bosnian Serbs who did 
acknowledge crimes and offered an apology to victims. In her statement, Plavšić said: 
“There is a justice which demands a life for each innocent life, a death for each 
wrongful death. It is, of course, not possible for me to meet the demands of such 
justice. I can only do what is in my power and hope that it will be of some benefit, 
that having come to the truth, to speak it, and to accept responsibility.”310  
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Other statements of remorse were perceived by victims as important contributions to the 
process of establishment of truth. Emir Suljagić, a Srebrenica genocide survivor, wrote in 
an article after two highly positioned officers of Bosnian Serb Army pleaded guilty for 
crimes in Srebrenica. These two were the first officials that admitted that the massacre of 
Srebrenica ever happened. According to Suljagić, Momir Nikolić's confession — “in 
which he described in chilling detail how he helped organize the mass execution and 
burial and an extensive cover-up, all of which he says army superiors ordered him to 
carry out — punches a big hole in the Bosnian Serb wall of denial.”311 More importantly, 
these admissions may make a very important contribution to the process of establishment 
of truth and the right to know the truth. By having an opportunity to hear perpetrators 
who committed horrendous crimes, it can be argued that victims’ right to truth is fulfilled 
in a very specific way. Suljagić argues: 
“But the confessions have brought me a sense of relief I have not known since the 
fall of Srebrenica in 1995. They have given me the acknowledgment I have been 
looking for these past eight years. While far from an apology, these admissions 
are a start. We Bosnian Muslims no longer have to prove we were victims. Our 
friends and cousins, fathers and brothers were killed — and we no longer have to 
prove they were innocent.” 
 
Hence, admission of guilt does not only contribute to truth in providing 
information about crimes that were committed, their specific circumstances, 
participants, as well as the reasons for them, but also to one specific aspect of 
truth about crimes – the status of victims when crimes occurred. Victims no 
longer have to prove that their suffering was real; no longer have to listen to 
explanations that distort the full and complete truth about abuses they have 
survived.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
The SATRC stated in its final report that it had dealt with four notions of truth – “factual 
or forensic truth; personal or narrative truth; social or ‘dialogue’ truth (see below) and 
healing and restorative truth”.312 The type of truth which is of primary interest for the 
purposes of this thesis is that of “factual or forensic” truth. In so far as truth commissions 
and tribunals are necessarily involved with establishing the truth in the sense of “facts” 
about state crimes and other human rights abuses committed during past conflicts factual 
truth must be a main preoccupation of transitional justice. In search for this truth, they 
typically focus on obtaining information about human rights abuses from victims, by 
taking statements and conducting public hearings where victims tell their stories of 
suffering. However, both the SATRC and the ICTY invented further and creative 
mechanisms in order to obtain more truth. These two institutions were either victims-
oriented, as in the case of SATRC, or enjoyed strong support from victims, as in the case 
of the ICTY. But their attempts to obtain more information and a wider range of relevant 
factual truths also had to include those that could provide vital information not available 
from victims – perpetrators. Both bodies thus adopted ‘a carrot and a stick’ approach 
towards perpetrators in order to establish more truth and to create a more comprehensive 
account of the past as a primary goal of these truth processes. In so doing both the 
SATRC and the ICTY had to make compromises with perpetrators in order to establish 
truth and gain more knowledge about the past.  
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the main research question of this thesis, is whether the process of 
plea bargaining with perpetrators introduced at the ICTY, compared to the practice of full 
disclosure as a condition for granting amnesty at the SATRC, contributed to the process 
of establishment of truth. In conclusion we can now highlight several key issues in 
relation to this question. As discussed in Chapter 4, it was the complexity of cases facing 
the ICTY, requiring investigation of complex links between perpetrators and other 
indicted persons, formal and informal chains of commands, and the  lack of documentary 
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evidences together with other practical reasons, such as the increased number of cases 
and financial issues, which informed the decision of the ICTY to introduce a plea-
bargaining practice. Other issues, such as the contribution of plea bargaining as a tool for 
securing judgments and contributing to accountability received more attention in critical 
assessments of the ICTY’s shift to a plea-bargaining practice. By comparison, the 
possible contribution of the plea bargaining process to the establishment of truth has not 
received much attention. However, for our purposes it is important to analyse the several 
elements that can be argued to have made a contribution to the establishment of truth as 
consequences of introducing compromises with perpetrators through the plea bargaining 
process at the ICTY. 
 
First, as our account in the previous chapters have shown, both the ICTY’s plea 
bargaining and the SATRC’s conditional amnesty processes, did in fact significantly 
contribute to the establishing of factual truths, by obtaining acknowledgments from those 
responsible for the atrocities they had committed. As Slye has observed, the importance 
of obtaining acknowledgment from those who actually perpetrated the state crimes and 
human rights abuses is that it may serve as confirmation of claims of victims: “The 
importance of the amnesty process hearings was that they provided a space in which 
individuals acknowledged their participation, thus providing personal and official 
validation of what many already knew, and making it much harder for individuals to deny 
the truth of the atrocities.”313 One of the most important benefits of obtaining 
acknowledgment of perpetrators, for victims particularly but also for society as a whole, 
is this public confirmation of past political atrocities and human rights abuses.  
 
Secondly, obtaining full disclosures of their crimes and guilty pleas from perpetrators 
amount to a ‘powerful acknowledgment of wrongdoing’, by wrongdoers themselves.314 
This can be even more important to victims than having their suffering acknowledged by 
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those who did not cause it. As Emir Suljagić, a survivor of the Srebrenica genocide said, 
victims do not need to prove they were victims.315 
 
In short, victims’ truth about state crimes and human rights abuses , which had been 
either concealed or denied as false or inaccurate, is confirmed by the public 
acknowledgment of perpetrators.  
 
Thirdly, acknowledgment of perpetrators contributed to the ICTY and SATRC as truth 
processes by revealing information which had previously been unknown – such as the 
location of graves or victims’ remains. In one of these cases, Dragan Nikolić, former 
commander of  the camp Sušica, who pleaded guilty for crimes in this camp, was asked 
by mother of two missing sons, during his sentencing hearing whether he knows what 
had happened to her sons.316   
 
Nikolić accepted her request after consultation with counsel and answered to her:  
 
“As far as her sons are concerned, (…) they were taken to Debelo Brdo and 
liquidated. (…) And it was in this group of people that Enis and Bernis, this lady's 
sons, were. I knew them well. And from what I heard, there were liquidated -- 
they were liquidated on that site. I don't know how far the exhumations have 
gone. And as the lady says, all their ID's were removed. I don't know if anything 
was found on the bodies; maybe some clothing. And if I remember her sons well, 
one of her sons was wearing a denim jacket and trousers. And should there be an 
exhumation, perhaps he could be recognised by his clothes. And if an exhumation 
takes place, I believe that's where her sons would be found.”317 
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At a more general level the perpetrators’ acknowledgments obtained through the ICTY’s 
plea-bargaining agreements and the SATRC condition of “full disclosure” for amnesty 
served an important function in establishing a more complete picture of past political 
atrocities. Acknowledgment and disclosures by perpetrators, through processes designed 
by the ICTY and the amnesty process at the SATRC provided important information 
about command structures, links between perpetrators, chains of command, institutional 
and organisational links, but also about generally prevailing motives and perspectives. 
The criteria and conditions set by both the ICTY and the TRC enabled them to obtain 
information on institutions and perpetrators indirectly associated with atrocities even if 
they did not participate in these crimes. Perpetrators pleading guilty before the ICTY 
were obliged to testify against other indicted persons, mainly against their superiors and 
associates,318 while amnesty applicants had to fulfill the criterion of having a political 
objective. In this way ICTY prosecutors were able to obtain more information about 
crimes and to use this information in revealing complex connections between 
perpetrators, especially when faced with a lack of documentary evidences. Additionally, 
acknowledgment of perpetrators obtained at the ICTY and the TRC, provided important 
contribution to revealing the prevailing motives and perspectives of perpetrators. As 
argued by Sarkin, “without an adequate understanding of why perpetrators carry out 
human rights violations, little can be done to address the circumstances and structures 
that could allow for these violations to be recommitted in the future”.319   
 
Another feature that needs to be addressed when analysing the contribution of 
acknowledgment of perpetrators through the ICTY’s plea bargaining process and the 
SATRC’s conditional amnesty process to the process of establishing truth is its 
contribution to the creation of historical record. Scholars have indicated that the 
contribution to creating a more accurate historical record has been one of the most 
important contributions of these practices. Tieger and Shin explained that the efficiency 
of plea bargaining allowed for more cases to be completed and therefore provide more 
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contributions to historical record.320 Perpetrators were obliged to submit written 
statements as part of their pleas in which many revealed important information, unknown 
until then, and which also revealed their perspectives on past events and in many cases, 
their motives. However, it has also been argued that in some cases, in particular the form 
of plea bargaining, which included charge bargaining which implied the prosecutor’s 
removal of charges for which the defendant did not pleaded guilty, may actually distorted 
the historical record created by the ICTY. As Scharf argued in the case Biljana Plavšić, 
“she did not provide evidence related to the dropped genocide charges and the dropping 
of those charges may be erroneously viewed in Serbia as an admission by the prosecutor 
that those crimes did not take place”321. Removal of charges, especially the most serious 
ones, while important as a tool to induce perpetrators to plead guilty, cannot be viewed as 
contributing to the process of establishment of truth. On the other hand, the SATRC 
amnesty process with its open-ended requirement of “full disclosure”, served as a 
potentially better mechanism to obtain more information about past abuses.  
 
Criticism of both the ICTY’s plea-bargaining procedures and the SATRC conditional 
amnesty process remains – compromises with perpetrators are never desired models for 
transitional justice processes, especially from victims’ perspectives. Truth commissions 
or tribunals which include these features will inevitably face serious challenges and  
allegations that they are ‘trading justice for efficiency’ or ‘being lenient towards 
perpetrators’. However, if the objective of establishing the truth about past abuses is 
intended to be comprehensive, then any truth process will also have to include those who 
were responsible for crimes, because only they can provide the most important 
acknowledgment and the one most difficult to obtain – acknowledgment by those who 
actually committed the state crimes and human rights abuses concerned.  
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